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Abstract
This essay investigates the relationship between the internationalization of
banks, profitability and shareholder value. We argue that in general
internationalization has not contributed to profitability, and shareholders have
not gained by investing in banks with more international activities. Adatabase
with internationalization measures is constructed for the 3 to 5 largest banks
in 8 countries between 1980 and 2003, leading to a sample of 44 banks. The
transnationality index is calculated for each bank, combining foreign assets,
foreign income and foreign staff into one index.
To  examine the relationship between internationalization and performance,
we calculated the difference between foreign and domestic profitability. We
also investigate if more internationalization is related to more profitability.
The key finding is that foreign profitability tends to be lower than domestic,
and a negative relationship exists between total profitability and
internationalization. Also, a “J-curve” shape appears, suggesting that up to
a certain degree of internationalization (roughly 40% of foreign staff, income
and assets), costs tend to outrun benefits. A similar pattern emerges forshareholder return: banks that either strongly or moderately increased their
internationalization activities generated the lowest shareholder return as
a group, while banks that retreated generated the most.
For the future, we identify banks which are likely in the near future to reassess
their internationalization strategy, either to develop a business model where
internationalization activities are a stable and profitable source of income, or
where banks refocus their attention to the domestic banking market.TABLE OF CONTENTS
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1.1 Introduction
After a relatively quiet period in 2001/2002, international mergers and
acquisitions have picked up again. Since the 2003 mergers between Bank of
America and FleetBoston, and JPMorganChase’s acquisition of Bank One,
speculations were fueled about comparable cross-border deals in the
European banking market. A joint study of PriceWaterhouseCoopers and the
Economist Intelligence Unit (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004) showed that
a European strategic response still had to be formulated. Also, smaller “nuts
and bolts” acquisitions were found to be more likely than large cross border
deals. JPMorganChase announced its purchase of London based Cazenove in
October 2004, while Spanish Banco Santander bought British mortgage bank
Abbey National for 12.5 billion euro in august 2004, the largest cross border
acquisition since HSBC bought French CCF in 2001.
On the other hand, restructuring also took place. Credit Suisse announced in
December 2004 that it would absorb First Boston, its global investment bank,
into the parent organization to revive profits. After barely four years, ING
sold the largest part of its German bank BHF to Sal Oppenheim while
expanding its Internet banking activities.
These examples reflect the increased internationalized nature of banking
competitions in three respects (Llewellyn, 1999). Customers that have global
financing opportunities are able to arbitrage between domestic, foreign banks
and capital markets. Also, banks are not restricted to business in their own
country. Finally, regulatory entry barriers have lowered, making it easier for
banks to locate in other countries.
In other words, many of the largest banks in the world have been struggling
toward a new organizational model where terms as home market seem to
become a by-product in a broader strategic vision.
Swiss bank UBS, the fifth largest bank in the world measured by assets in
2000, has more than 80% of its assets outside Switzerland. Netherlands based
bank ABN Amro owns a retail branch network in Brazil, 9,500 km from
Amsterdam which constituted 15% of total profits in 2000. Successes in
international banking are few, failures have been common. One of the more
7spectacular failures was the acquisition of American Crocker Bank by British
Midland Bank in 1981, costing the bank USD 1bn over the next five years and
forcing its strategy to retreat on the British retail banking market. Midland
was acquired by Hong Kong based bank HSBC in 1992, a bank who
subsequently showed that internationalization can be a profitable activity.
From the 1980s banks internationalized on an unprecedented scale. In 2003
the 30 largest banks held more than USD 7,586bn, or 39% of their assets,
outside their home country. To understand whether international expansion
has affected the banks’operations, and identify if additional performance and
shareholder return was created by internationalization, this study analyzes the
internationalization strategies and financial performance of the
world’s largest banks from eight countries between 1980 and 2003.
Internationalization – undertaking banking activities outside the home
country – has been a major driver in the transformation of bank organization
in the last two decades. The main findings can be summarized as follows:
● In the 1980s the overall degree of internationalization for the whole sample
basically did not change much. In the 1990s, the degree of internationalization
systematically increased, but the increase was concentrated with a small
number of banks. For the bank sample as awhole, internationalization has not
led to higher profitability levels. Even though the banks in the sample have
been amongst the largest and leading internationalisers, most have not been in
a situation to profit from this strategic choice.
● The largest banks, however, have not pursued uniform internationalization
strategies. Retreating as well increasingly international strategies could be
observed. In the 1980–2000 period, around one quarter of the banks faced
a stagnant level of internationalization, one quarter retreated, while one
quarter slowly and one quarter strongly internationalized.
● Between 1980 and 2000, the banks in the sample showed on average lower
profitability on foreign banking activities than on domestic banking
activities. They reported a decrease in total profitability when their degree
of internationalization was higher, and also showed higher variability of
profitability. If banks had intended to increase their profitability by serving
new foreign banking markets and clients, or profit from geographical
diversification, then on average they did not succeed.
● Banks with different internationalization strategies realized different
returns for shareholders. Banks that either strongly or moderately
8 Overviewincreased their internationalization activities showed the lowest
shareholder returns. On the other hand, banks that retreated from
internationalization activities and (re)focused on their domestic banking
business generated the highest shareholder returns. But banks with
established internationalization strategies, showing a long term
commitment to their international banking activities, generated the highest
shareholder return.
1.2 Set up of the research
Several research stages were adopted. First, a broad and representative
sample of banks was selected. The 3 to 5 largest banks by assets with
substantial international activities were chosen for the United States, the
United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain, Switzerland, the Netherlands and
Japan. In 1995 this sample amounted to 34 banks; mergers and acquisitions
increased the sample to 44 banks. As a group, these banks command over
48% of total global assets of banks between 1980 and 2003.
The internationalization of banks was investigated between 1980 and 2003.
This long period was chosen to take full advantage of the disclosed
geographical information, especially for American and British banks. Also,
1980 as a starting year is a natural demarcation point in the
internationalization strategies of banks. In particular, the emerging market
loans crises from 1981 onwards initiated for many banks a decade of
reorientation on the role of their international activities. Arguably, the
strategic reorientation in the 1980s also has substantially influenced
internationalization activities of banks in the 1990s. An assumption when
using a long time period is that banks and their managers have a long term
memory: what the bank did in 1980 has relevance for their activities in 1990
or even later. A long time period is not uncommon in management studies –
well known examples are “In Search of Excellence” by Peters and Waterman
(1982), “Built to Last” by Collins and Portas (1993) or “Good to Great” by
Collins (2001) – but longitudinal studies covering most leading companies of
one sector remain relatively rare.
Next, a database was developed, collecting internationalization data for
different indicators. For each bank the degree of internationalization was
calculated which yielded an internationalization index. This provided the
basis for developing a strategic typology of internationalization. Different
phases of expansion, restructuring and retreat were combined with a scan of
Overview 9client-arena-products targeted by the bank during these periods. Achoice was
made not to look at intended or announced strategies but at realized strategies,
compiling information from newspapers, annual reports and other sources.
This led to the identification of five different types of realized
internationalization strategies: Moderate,  Accelerating,  Established,
Retreating and Imploding.
The types of realized internationalization strategies were then used in the next
research phase, focussing on the effectiveness of internationalization. First, it
was investigated which incentives are relevant for the internationalization of
banks. With a pooled data regression model, several tests were performed,
varying the time period, grouping the data per country or per realized strategy.
Performance was addressed by first looking at the available data: difference
in foreign and domestic profitability was calculated, based on the available
data from annual reports. Alternative tests were set up to determine a broader
relationship between performance and the degree of internationalization.
Finally, integration was pursued by determining the relationship between
incentives to internationalize, performance and shareholder return for the five
different types of realized internationalization strategies.
1.3 Structure of the paper
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, I introduce the sample of banks
and their characteristics. Chapter 3 presents a brief overview of historic
developments, after which the patterns of internationalization strategies are
discussed. Based on the banks’degree of internationalization, I construct five
groups with different realized strategies. Chapter 4 focuses on the relationship
between internationalization and profitability, and uses the strategic patterns
identified in Chapter 3 to examine their effects on shareholder return. Finally,
Chapter 5 assesses the results and speculates on future internationalization.
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The world’s largest banks are a highly visible group, not in the least through
their physical presence around the worlds, adding global brand names such as
Citigroup or HSBC for millions of customers. On the other hands, this
visibility exposes banks to criticism in times of financial crises, especially
if they emerge relatively unscathed from such crises with adverse
consequences for the foreign economies which is not the case for the foreign
markets (cf. Greider, 1997). This chapter discusses two themes: the
description of the sample and definition of degree of internationalisation. The
sample consists of the world’s largest banks. What are their characteristics?
Studying them as a group, what biases are introduced? Furthermore we define
what is meant by internationalisation and calculate appropriate measures.
2.1 The world’s largest banks
The sample consists of the five largest banks measured by total assets in the
Netherlands, Germany, France, United Kingdom, United States, Switzerland,
Spain and Japan, as determined in the benchmark year 1995. These banks
have been involved in internationalization activities between 1980 and 2000.
In the case of both the Netherlands and Switzerland initially only three banks
were included for the benchmark year 1995, due to high concentration of
banking activities in these countries.
One bank was added to the Dutch sample: Fortis, the Belgian/Dutch bank
whose administrative headquarters is in Belgium but has extensive Dutch
operations. For the United Kingdom, HSBC has been included as a United
Kingdom bank in 1995. The bank relocated to the United Kingdom from 1992
after the acquisition of Midland Bank. Therefore, HSBC has been included
from 1992 onwards in the sample. This leads to an initial list of 37 banks for
the benchmark year 1995, whose key characteristics are listed in Table 2.2.
Including predecessors, the total sample for 1980–2003 consists of 44 banks.
The banks in the sample have several characteristics in common. First, most
banks have not only been among the largest banks in their countries in 1995,
but also between 1980 and 2003. All banks combined have taken up a major
share of the assets, capital and profits of the world’s 100 largest banks. Also,
11between 1980 and 2003 all banks in the sample have been engaged in
international banking activities.
In this study, internationalization patterns are not differentiated by banking
type because most banks in the sample are universal banks, providing a broad
range of commercial banking services. European banks have historically
provided the widest range of financial services, while United States banks
have historically offered a more limited range of financial services,
converging over time to universal banks as regulation changed. A limited
number of (mostly European) banks also have become part of, merged with,
or came to own insurers. In the study, the bank activities of the bank-insurers
are considered. Table 2.1 lists the most noteworthy combinations of banks and
insurers.
Table 2.1. Combinations of insurers and banks in sample between 1980 and 2000
Finally, most banks in the sample have had publicly traded bank shares.
Banks, who did not have publicly traded bank shares either were nationalized,
owned by government institutions or have had a co-operative status. Two
banks have been nationalized (Paribas, Société Générale in 1982) and
re-privatized (Paribas in 1986, Société Générale in 1987). Crédit Lyonnais
was effectively nationalized between 1992 and 2000. Furthermore, three
banks have a co-operative structure and have had no publicly traded shares.
The Rabobank and Crédit Agricole share co-operative ownership, and are
mainly owned by the local associated banks, while West Deutsche
Landesbank is owned by the state government. Mergers and acquisitions
Year Country  Activity 
    
1988  United Kingdom  Acquisition of insurer Abbey Life by Lloyds Bank 
1989-90  Netherlands/Belgium  Formation of Fortis through merger of Dutch bank 
VSB and insurer AMEV with Belgian insurer Groupe 
AG and bank ASLK 
1990  Netherlands  Acquisition of insurer Interpolis by Rabobank. 
1991  Netherlands  Formation ING Group through merger NMB 
Postbank with insurer Nationale Nederlanden. 
1997  Switzerland  Acquisition of insurer Winterthur by Credit Suisse 
1998 United  States  Formation  Citigroup  by  merger Citicorp and insurer 
Travelers group. 
2000  Germany  Acquisition Dresdner Bank by insurer Allianz  
    
12 Bank sample and degree of internationalizationdetermine the dynamics of the sample; the number of banks decreased from
34 banks in 1980 to 29 banks in 2003.
Table 2.2. Key indicators banks in benchmark year 1995
Asset growth and distribution on a country level are presented in Table 2.3.
Total reported assets increased from USD 2,260bn in 1980 to USD 19,513bn
in 2003. Total assets increased with an 11.7% annualized growth rate from
1980 to 1990 levelling off to 8.3% between 1990 and 2003, generating an
annual average asset growth of 9.8% over the total period. The difference in
asset growth might indicate:
● Change in currency.  Fluctuations in the currencies have increased or
decreased relative positions in US dollar terms. For example, the surge in
Country Bank Total assets, Capital and Profit before tax, Costs, Staff
mln US dollar reserves, % capital and % total income
% total assets reserves
France Crédit Agricole 381,386              5.35 11.88 63.12 74,380              
BNP 320,954              5.94 3.27 74.96 53,600              
Crédit Lyonnais 334,911              2.27 5.51 83.36 59,018              
Paribas 268,618              4.63 -0.64 82.30 25,841              
Société Générale 322,194              3.42 10.27 74.10 45,374              
GermanyB ayerische Hypobank 207,229              3.06 14.85 59.23 16,239              
Commerzbank 280,527              3.05 9.69 70.36 25,826              
Deutsche Bank 500,898              3.89 12.71 71.56 74,119              
Dresdner Bank 336,273              2.85 14.50 74.09 46,890              
Bayerische Vereinsbank 247,472              2.89 12.97 64.31 22,188              
Westdeutsche Landesbank 294,826              2.98 8.73 74.91 9,670                
SpainA rgentaria 106,641              5.05 12.89 52.78 16,715              
BBV 115,429              5.38 19.10 60.02 34,178              
BCH 91,597               4.48 5.10 71.18 29,369              
Santander 134,453              5.21 17.03 67.11 42,023              
Switzerland Credit Suisse 358,536              4.21 12.12 63.14 34,310              
SBC 250,569              4.89 9.68 73.55 27,236              
UBS 336,193              6.17 8.44 69.19 29,071              
United Kingdom Barclays 261,681              4.37 27.91 70.17 92,400              
HSBC 351,457              6.80 23.31 55.69 101,070             
Lloyds TSB 204,213              4.78 25.79 65.99 91,044              
National Westminster 287,541              6.74 7.75 69.07 72,500              
Standard Chartered 60,348               5.15 32.98 59.20 26,953              
NetherlandsA BN-Amro 338,785              6.13 11.47 67.48 63,694              
Fortis 174,571              6.19 13.16 74.18 30,388              
ING bank 153,217              6.49 10.93 70.87 28,015              
Rabobank 181,956              6.18 10.99 67.07 37,437              
United States Bank of America 232,446              8.70 22.58 61.51 79,900              
Chase Manhattan 121,063              7.37 20.70 67.47 33,618              
Chemical Banking 182,926              6.51 24.89 59.15 39,078              
Citicorp 269,000              7.28 28.52 59.44 85,300              
JP Morgan 184,879              5.65 18.24 67.72 15,613              
Japan Dai Ichi Kangyo 519,193              3.70 8.37 46.61 18,069              
IBJ 383,301              3.25 -8.02 45.01 5,362                
Mitsubishi Bank 514,187              4.53 3.76 60.03 14,977              
Sumitomo Bank 528,217              3.46 1.44 83.30 18,104              
Bank of Tokyo 250,102              5.23 5.28 47.38 17,538              
Source. Annual reports, the Banker top 1000 1995, issue July 1996
Bank sample and degree of internationalization 13the Japanese Yen substantially increased the size of Japanese banks in dollar
terms.
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● Saturation. Due to their large size, it may have become more difficult to
maintain high levels of asset growth.
● Change in monetary regime. Total assets are positively correlated to the
level of money supply, whose growth has been more restricted in the
1990s than the 1980s.
● Change in management focus: The focus of a bank may have shifted from
asset growth as a management goal to other goals such as profitability and
capitalization.
● Change in regulation. The implementation of the capital adequacy rules
from 1988 onwards provided a regulatory framework for new management
drivers. For example, when banks evaluated granting new loans, it also
became important to consider the effect on capital reserves, effectively
lowering asset growth. Clearly, change in regulation and change in
management focus are intertwined.
Table 2.3. Distribution of assets in sample
If the distribution of assets in the sample per country for 2000 is compared to
1980, then the asset share of French banks has decreased, as have United
States banks and to a lesser extent banks in the United Kingdom. German
banks have shown the largest increase, followed by Swiss and Dutch banks.
1980 1990 2000
Sum of total 
assets
% Sample N Sum of total 
assets
% Sample N Sum of total 
assets
% Sample N
France 452,493         20.5              5     1,295,341      19.3              5     1,743,338      12.8              4    
Germany 348,658         15.8              6     995,102         14.8              6     2,791,265      20.5              5    
Spain na na na 194,630         2.9                3     600,240         4.4                2    
Switzerland 121,990         5.5                3     494,405         7.4                3     1,268,023      9.3                2    
United Kingdom 315,480         14.3              5     757,639         11.3              5     1,774,937      13.1              5    
Netherlands 162,845         7.4                4     481,777         7.2                4     1,559,380      11.5              4    
United States 442,337         20.0              6     653,430         9.7                6     1,909,146      14.1              3    
Japan 368,055         16.6              5     1,843,810      27.5              5     1,937,306      14.3              4    
Total2 ,211,857      100.0            34   6,716,134      100.0            37   13,583,635    100.0            29  
Note: Total assets in million US dollar. N is the number of banks in the sample for the specified country
na: Spanish banks are not included in the sample prior to 1990 due to data availability
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1 Cf. the introductions to the yearly Banker Top 500 or 1000 listings, where currency
fluctuations are a recurring theme in explaining fluctuations in the ranking of banks.Japanese banks have maintained roughly the same asset share in 1980 and
2000, but dominated the sample in 1990 with 27.5%.
The number of banks is relatively small but represents a large portion of the
country’s assets, profits and capital. These figures are presented in Table 2.4
where these key-indicators are compared to the top 100 banks and top 1,000
banks as compiled by The Banker.
Table 2.4. Bank sample compared to Banker Top 100 and Top 1,000, in USD bn.
Table 2.4 shows that the sample dominates the 100 largest banks in terms of
total assets, capital and profits before tax, averaging between 48 and 54% for
the reported periods, compared to the top 100 banks. Exception is the share
of profits in 1990, although this measure is bound to be more volatile than
assets or capital. Total assets of the sample as a share of the Top 100 largest
banks increased by 5.7% from 48.1% in 1990 to 53.8% in 2000, while the
asset increase of the sample as a share of the 1000 largest banks was 7.4% in
the same period. This suggests that the Top 100 as a whole has increasingly
grown in size at a higher pace than the Top 1000. On the other hand, the
capital share increase of the sample compared to the Top 100 and Top 1000
between 1990 and 2000 is much more subdued 3.0% for the share in the
Top 100 and 1.5% for the share in the Top 1000.
Summarizing, a sample based on the five largest banks for eight countries
with the benchmark year 1995 has led to a group of banks with relatively
stable characteristics. The choice of size as a selection criterion implies that
the banks, in terms of assets, capital or profitability, form a large part of the
largest 100 or largest 1000 banks in the world. There is no indication that they
have a relatively higher share of profitability or capital though. Based on asset
size, the concentration in the sample has remained stable and low between
Assets Capital
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Sample 2,208.3       6,472.3       14,914.0     83.0        255.5      580.7      14.2        31.5        128.5     
Top 100 4,200.2       13,065.2     26,577.4     147.9      535.1      1,133.1   24.3        69.9        224.5     
Top 1000 19,900.0     36,700.0     828.5      1,784.8   113.3      309.7     
Sample, % Top 100 52.6            49.5            56.1            56.1        47.8        51.2        58.3        45.1        57.2       
Sample, % Top 1000 32.5            40.6            30.8        32.5        27.8        41.5       
Profit before tax
Source: The Banker July issues 2001, 1991, 1981. Totals Top 1000 for assets, capital, profit before tax are listed in the 
Banker July 2001 issue, p. 158
Bank sample and degree of internationalization 151980 and 2000. There have however been shifts in relative sizes: for example,
the Japanese banks dominated the sample in 1990.
2.2 Degree of internationalization
The aim of this study is to measure and to analyze the level of
internationalization of the banks in the sample. There are different approaches
to measure a banks’ degree of internationalization, and estimating the degree
of internationalization of a firm or bank is to some extent arbitrary. An initial
approach could be to construct a single item indicator; Sullivan (1994)
reviewed 17 studies which all applied a single item indicator to measure the
degree of internationalization, i.e. foreign sales to total sales. However the use
of a single item indicator increases the potential error of measurement,
because it is for example more prone to external shocks. An alternate
approach is to combine several indicators into one index. Depending on the
choice of indicators, this might provide a better approximation of the degree
of internationalization, but the choice of indicators may be restricted on data
availability rather than theoretical induction (Sullivan, 1994).
This study applies three single item indicators, which are combined in
a composite index to analyze the degree of internationalization of a bank, the
Transnationality Index (TNI). The TNI is one of the most cited indicators for
internationalization (cf. United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, 1998, van Tulder, van den Berghe, & Muller, 2001). The index
is expressed as a percentage and calculated as an unweighted average of 1)
foreign assets to total assets ratio, 2) foreign gross income to total gross
income ratio and 3) foreign employment to total employment ratio.
2
The general appeal of the TNI is that the degree of internationalization is
presented in one scale, which by definition moves between 0 and 100. Also an
internationalization index that incorporates income, staff and assets captures
aricher picture of the bank’sforeign activities than that which would be captured
by income, staff and assets separately (cf. Sullivan, 1994). Another attractive
characteristic is that the TNI dampens the effect of finance companies or off shore
funding constructions if aratio were only based on foreign assets relative to total
assets. A substantial amount of assets can a priori be expected to be located in
tax havens or countries with lenient fiscal regimes. Such reported assets would
16 Bank sample and degree of internationalization
2 See Van den Berghe (2004) for a review of research on the use of these internationalization
indicators.be accompanied by low number of employees. Combining both employees and
assets in the TNI would then create a more balanced view. The same argument
also applies to investment banking activities that are concentrated in financial
centers outside the home country; these activities tend to generate a relatively
high degree of income with fewer employees.
There are several disadvantages when using an internationalization indicator
like the TNI: technological change, geographic boundaries, and data
availability.
● Technological change. A disadvantage of the TNI might be that the
construction of such an index cannot take account of the effects of
technological change. Changes in technology can for example raise
productivity and increase the assets or income per employee; if these
changes are distributed evenly over the total bank organization then its
effect on the TNI is probably limited. If the ratio of foreign assets per
foreign employee increases in the same amount as the ratio of domestic
assets per domestic employee, then technological change has no effect on
the TNI. From the mid 1990s however technological advances have had
other geographic distribution effects. For example, the development of
“Internet” banks like ING Direct implies that the share of foreign assets
and foreign income increases while staff and operations working for the
Internet bank basically remain at home. This might potentially depress the
true extent of internationalization measured by the TNI.
● Geographical boundaries. For Fortis, Belgian/Dutch corporate structure
creates a problem to determine what region is home or foreign. This is
solved in the database by denoting Benelux as home. Similarly, HSBC is
the only bank not disclosing information for the home country, instead
reporting Europe as ‘home region’.
● Data availability. Not all banks have consistently reported detailed
information on foreign assets, staff, income or profitability. Banks like SBC,
UBS or Deutsche Bank did not report this information although they
progressed significantly with their internationalization activities. A general
remark is usually found in the financial report stating something like “due to
the integrated nature of our activities worldwide a geographical breakdown
does not provide additional information”; the information provided by British
and American banks in the 1980s proves otherwise. Data collection from
other sources provided valuable information. For example, foreign banks in
the United States have to report their balance sheets to the Federal Reserve.
Bank sample and degree of internationalization 17Table 2.5. Key statistics of internationalization indicators of total sample, selected
years
Table 2.5 presents the key internationalization indicators for selected years
between 1980 and 2003. The average bank in the sample has operated roughly
one-third of its banking activities outside the home country between 1980 and
2000. The average TNI was 29% in 1980, remaining stable in the 1980s,
rising to 39% in 2000. These percentages are consistent with the ones
reported in the annual listings of the Banker from 1992 onwards. Other
comparisons however are not available; the degree of internationalization for
non-financial firms has been better documented. For the top 100 trans
18 Bank sample and degree of internationalization







        
Average
a 1 980 34.83  47.66 20.95 28.97 
 1 985 35.10  40.29 20.42 28.61 
 1 990 32.51  32.29 23.16 28.34 
 1 995 36.10  33.49 26.71 31.93 
 2 000 39.72  40.55 41.41 39.36 
 2 003 39.21  39.99 45.37 40.45 
          
Weighted   1980  34.91 48.86 21.30 35.02 
Average
b 1 985 35.00  41.18 24.28 33.49 
 1 990 34.20  33.16 25.02 30.79 
 1 995 36.91  34.53 29.78 33.74 
 2 000 41.78  39.95 43.45 41.73 
 2 003 38.88  34.71 47.67 40.42 
          
Median
c 1 980       35.63        53.49        13.80        28.98  
 1 985       34.29        40.51        13.85        30.46  
 1 990       31.12        36.00        20.24        29.31  
 1 995       31.71        31.98        26.76        30.18  
 2 000       33.42        35.67        37.45        34.24  
 2 003       34.00        43.12        45.00        40.19  
        
          
Note a: Indicators 1,2,3 and TNI are calculated as arithmetic average; the sum divided by the number 
of cases.  
Note b: Indicators 1,2,3 are calculated as weighted averages. For example, foreign/total assets for 
one bank is weighted by the share of total assets of a bank in total assets of the sample, and then 
aggregated for all banks. For the TNI, the average of the weighted averages of indicators 1,2,3 is 
then calculated. 
Note c: Indicators 1,2,3 and TNI are median values, i.e. the value above and below which half the 
cases fall.   national (non-financial) corporations, as compiled for the UNCTAD World
Investment Report, the average degree of internationalization moved between
the 50-55% range between 1995 and 1998. Another measure of
internationalization is the one compiled by the SCOPE project, where the
degree of internationalization is determined for the 200 largest (non financial)
firms worldwide. For the year 1995 an average TNI is reported of 29.7
agreeing with the banks’ TNI to some extent; this however might simply be
a coincidence.
For the bank sample, the decrease in the 1980s is mainly due to the decrease
of foreign gross income. This decrease can largely be ascribed to British and
American banks, on the one hand reducing their activities in LDC loans and
selling off related activities outside the home country, on the other hand
increasing the share of domestic activities. Figure 2.1 shows the trend in more
detail, displaying average and median values for TNI.
Figure 2.1. Average TNI development between 1980 and 2000 (in %)
Initially in 1983-84, TNI was at its highest, declining until 1991. From that
period, TNI increased again, reaching higher levels (both for median and
average TNI) than in 1980. Between 1980 and 1993, median TNI was higher
than average TNI, indicating that there were relative many banks with a low
degree of internationalization. On the other hand, between 1994 and 2002
average TNI was higher than median TNI, suggesting a concentration of
banks with relatively high TNIs.
 
Bank sample and degree of internationalization 19The country averages for TNI can also provide useful information; if banks in
a country are considered as separate groups, then the development of
internationalization activities of banks has differed between countries. In
other words, there is a certain country-of-origin effect observable in banking.
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At the beginning of the 1980s, American and British banks showed the
highest degree of internationalization. In the 1980s, the degree of
internationalization decreased systematically for American banks, while this
applied to British banks from the mid 1980s.
The ascent of Japanese banks in the late 1980s in the international banking
arena also filled a relative void created by American and British banks in the
1980s. The internationalization activities of Japanese banks increased until
the early 1990s, their descent followed from the mid 1990s.
Table 2.6. Average TNI values per country
Continental European banks showed the strongest increase in degree of
internationalization between 1980 and 2003; the largest banks from the
Netherlands, Germany, Spain, France and Switzerland steadily increased
internationalization in the 1980s, which accelerated in the mid 1990s. From
1994 onwards, the TNI increased steadily, mainly propelled by German,
Dutch, French and Swiss banks. On average the TNI for British banks has
TNI N TNI N TNI N TNI N TNI N TNI N
France 19.73 5 24.93 5 26.75 5 30.53 5 30.13 4 40.34 3
Germany 8.45 6 8.95 6 12.17 6 23.20 6 39.04 5 42.52 5
Spain a. a. 20.39 3 21.34 4 57.72 2 51.80 2
Switzerland 31.95 3 31.69 3 41.30 3 42.78 3 67.39 2 68.77 2
United Kingdom 44.22 5 46.05 5 37.98 5 44.31 5 40.77 5 39.98 5
United States 18.34 4 21.61 4 23.23 4 29.75 4 47.61 4 46.23 4
USA 49.06 6 39.77 6 31.77 6 32.88 6 27.24 3 25.11 3
Japan 28.05 5 28.13 5 33.14 5 34.20 5 27.20 4 19.07 3
Average 28.97 34 28.61 34 28.34 37 31.93 37 39.36 29 40.45 27
a. Spanish banks are not included in the sample prior to 1990.
The TNI is calculated as arithmetic average, i.e. the sum divided by the number of cases.
2000 2003 1980 1985 1990 1995
20 Bank sample and degree of internationalization
3 Country averages have shown structural differences. For example, for TNI data from 1990
to 2003 the variability of the country means is tested with ANOVA, and the Bonferroni procedure
has been applied to determine which country means are different. The average TNI from banks in
Germany differ significantly (with p values < .05) from all other countries in the sample. Average
TNI in the United Kingdom differs significantly from French, German, American and Japanese
average TNI, but not from Dutch and Swiss. Finally, Japanese average TNI differs significantly
from average TNI in the United Kingdom. Although the sample is small and these statistics should
thus be treated with caution, it is an indication that country of origin matters in
internationalization.increased in the 1990s; however the increase is caused by the addition of
HSBC in the sample in 1992. The bank had a higher TNI than Lloyds,
National Westminster and Barclays, but also increased its TNI throughout the
1990s while the other British banks did not. American banks tended to show
decreasing TNIs at the end of the 1990s when domestic mergers in the United
States raised the relative weight of domestic activities between 1990 and
2000. In other words, in the 1980s the reduction of TNI for American banks
was caused by divestment of foreign activities, while domestic acquisitions in
the 1990s reduced the average TNI of American banks.
The individual components of TNI (foreign assets ratio, foreign income ratio,
foreign staff ratio) provide additional information; they are presented in
Figure 2.2. Foreign income was relatively high in the early 1980s, decreasing
between 1983 and 1989, steadily increasing again since 1991. Foreign assets
showed a similar pattern, but with less volatile changes than foreign income,
especially in the 1980s. On the other hand, the ratio of foreign employees was
relatively stable in the 1980s, but steadily increased in the 1990s.
The different trends of the underlying indicators illustrate that the
combination of income, staff and assets captures a richer picture of the
bank’s foreign activities (Sullivan, 1994). The three indicators suggest that
internationalization up to the early 1980s was income driven, while the
internationalization activities in the 1990s were both asset driven and
employee driven. In other words, setting up and acquiring investment banking
and corporate finance activities in the 1980s, while the major component of
internationalization activities of bank in the 1990s consisted of acquiring
retail banks.
Bank sample and degree of internationalization 21Figure 2.2. Average development key internationalization indicators
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3.1 Introduction
Internationalization for banks has progressed at different paces, with different
purposes. This chapter identifies these internationalization patterns. Several
motives are grounded in history. Therefore, we start with a brief historic
overview of internationalization in 3.2, after which stylized findings from the
case studies are discussed. In 3.3. we discuss the five different realized
internationalization strategies in more detail.
3.2 Historic overview
Internationalization of banks is not a new phenomenon. In 1913 there were
approximately 2,600 branches of foreign banks worldwide. The dominating
factor at that time was colonization, over 80% of those branches belonged to
British banks. The share of foreign banks accounted for one third of banking
assets in Latin America and over one half in countries like South Africa,
Turkey or China (Goldsmith, 1969). The financial empire of J.P. Morgan
started out as a partnership financing American civil war loans from England
(Chernow, 1990). International banking has in some respects not changed that
much. Over time, innovations in financial instruments, telecommunication,
information technology, organization innovation and the growing
sophistication of customers have meant a dramatic transformation in the
conduct of banking business and client relationships in international banking.
What sets the current internationalization of banks apart, and why does it
merit a study? The major reason is that the sheer size of international
involvement of banks has increased dramatically (cf. De Nicoló, Bartholomew,
Zaman, & Zephirin, 2004). Foreign assets of the thirty largest banks as
a percentage of total assets have changed from 35% in 1980 to over 38% in
2003. However, the absolute size of foreign assets of the thirty largest banks
has risen eleven fold from USD 650bn in 1990 to USD 7,571bn in 2000. The
increasing importance of foreign activities has affected profitability and
stability of internationalizing banks in their home country; it can also have
serious effects – positive as well as negative – on the host economies.
The vehemence with which banks have pursued internationalization strategies
also warrants an investigation.
23The dissolution of the British Empire meant that British banks represented the
“old” internationalization of banking. American banks on the other hand have
been on the rise since the Second World War. American financial aid, exports
of American firms and the export of American ideology such as freeing of
competition or creation of uniform markets were feeding ground for
internationalization activities of American banks, usually using London as
a springboard for activities in Europe and reversing the decline of London as
a financial center as a side effect. From the 1960s onwards income in Western
economies rose and banks developed more financial products to cater
households and businesses as increasing scale of firms raised transaction
volumes in corporate finance. American banks formed an apparent threat,
seeking out the more profitable activities in investment banking in Europe,
being equipped with better staff, more financial resources and more
experience.
The creation of off shore markets to circumvent (American) regulation and
the political potential of seizure of capital belonging to communist states
induced the first series of international activities, later propelled by the
inflation of capital markets when oil producing countries forced serious
wealth transfers. European banks either tried to work together in consortium
banks to participate in these activities (Roberts & Arnander, 2001) which in
the beginning was a cost saving and knowledge rewarding construction or set
up foreign activities themselves. Redistribution of the surpluses of oil
producing countries found their way to emerging markets, with American
banks leading the way. The growing volume of loans masked growing
economic imbalances, brought to light from 1981 onwards when Latin
American countries defaulted in their loans. Internationalization of banks
became a worldwide event (United Nations Centre on Transnational
Corporations, 1991). Institutions like the IMF aided governments with
restructuring loans, dealing with severed banks and capital markets in
distress. Governments of the lender banks, especially the United States, faced
potential crisis at home when the losses in emerging markets were transferred
by the large banks to their home country.
A consequence of this restructuring period was that in the 1980s capital
strength and adequate supervision of internationally operating banks were
major issues for bank regulators. Amajor coordination initiative took place in
the Basle Accord of 1988, creating more transparency and uniformity among
regulatory policies for internationally active banks. Among others, the Basle
Accord became one of the drivers for the Japanese banks to retreat from the
international arena. Japanese banks increased international activities sharply
24 Realized internationalization strategiesfrom the early 1980s fuelled by strong domestic economic growth, a fast pace
of deregulation and large flows of foreign direct investment by Japanese
industrial firms. The Japanese stock market decline from 1989 showed that
(international) banking strategies had not been based on sound banking
practices, affecting bank capital and loan quality at the same time (Canals,
1997). Japanese banks found ways to stave off restructuring of their bad loans
for almost a decade, contributing substantially to the prolongation of
economic recession, and steadily relinquishing their importance in
international banking.
A general trend fuelling international activities was the ongoing process of
disintermediation from mid-1960: large firms found it more profitable to
arrange loans directly with institutional investors, thereby bypassing the role
of banks as financial intermediaries. Additionally, stricter monetary policies
introduced from the late 1970s onwards eventually led to a steady decrease of
interest rates consequently lowering income from the core business of banks.
These trends forced banks to reconsider their strategic business portfolios.
Non-interest income, especially the high margins of fees and commissions in
investment banking, became a promising route. The liberalization of British
securities markets in 1984 was followed by an unprecedented wave of
acquisitions by host banks. By the end of the 1990s British owned investment
banks or securities houses in London were few in number; London as an
important financial center had become a manifest of internationalization
activities of banks.
Internationalization of banks was also a response to further regional
integration and deregulation (cf. Group of Ten, 2001, January). In Europe
especially, banks were aware that the competition for larger clients extended
over the geographic borders, but the competition for retail clients remained
a domestic issue. By the mid-1980s European integration created momentum
in Europe, redefining markets for banking activities on a multinational scale.
Mergers and acquisitions became an important strategic tool for banks. They
generally took place in two phases: domestic consolidation and then,
international expansion; the creation of higher domestic concentration in
order to more effectively compete internationally. Opportunity was provided
by the capital markets (lower interest rates and higher stock market prices)
and the regulators, privatizing banks or not opposing the takeovers.
The close of the decade shows the financial might of just a handful of banks:
the top 25 banks in 1980 had total assets of USD 1,858bn, equal to 30% of GDP.
In 2000 this had risen to 64% of GDP, a combined total of USD 12,781bn. Of
Realized internationalization strategies 25this amount, 41% are assets outside the home country. In fact, foreign banks
practically control the banking sectors in many Eastern European countries; for
some observers the “single global banking space is almost a reality”
(Mullineux & Murinde, 2003). The foreign owned assets of the largest banks
exhibit uneven geographic patterns, “regions and/or countries of the developed
world currently represent the most interconnected cluster of national banking
systems” (De Nicoló, Bartholomew, Zaman, & Zephirin, 2004).
3.3 Internationalization patterns: stylized findings
What did the banks with internationalization strategies have in common, and
how did they differ? Using a case study approach, realized
internationalization strategies for 44 banks from 8 countries were analyzed.
Internationalization patterns were analyzed, supported by the TNI
development of the bank. The different phases in TNI development were
clustered in strategic phases. First, some generic commonalities and
differences in internationalization activities are discussed, using a framework
to cluster phases in internationalization, clients, products and organizational
forms. Commonalities and differences for clients and products are first
reviewed after which organizational form and phases in internationalization
are discussed. Integration is pursued by applying the previous findings to five
stylized types of realized internationalization strategies.
3.3.1 Internationalization cycle
The case studies suggest the following stylized internationalization cycle:
starting in the 1970s, bank internationalization originally consisted of setting
up banking activities in financial centers and economic centers. Part of this
was related to incentives such as “follow-the-client” or aimed at increasing
overall profitability. Additionally, restructuring and expansion in the domestic
markets might have been cumbersome for some and impossible for other
banks, further stimulating internationalization. Regulatory idiosyncrasies in
the home market might be one explanation for this, but also the existence of
a home bias ‘inertia’: restructuring the domestic retail networks in the early
1980s might have been more difficult with vested interests in the home
country such as labor unions. In particular, banks in smaller countries had to
expand abroad for fear of anti-trust regulation at home.
26 Realized internationalization strategiesFigure 3.1. Stylized Internationalization patterns of banks
For most banks during the 1980s, international expansion supported their
domestic strategies and was relatively small compared to the home country. So
banks did not have to attract additional capital. When banks initiated larger
acquisitions in the late 1980sand 1990s, external capital became more important
as a source of financing. (Domestic and foreign) shareholders not only provided
additional capital to expand. They also followed management more closely, and
pressed for changes when expected results were not delivered. An increasing
shareholder role and foreign profitability that was below expectations, led bank
managers to change objectives in the mid 1990s: profitability should be internally
generated, the domestic base strengthened and foreign activities divested if they
did not contribute satisfactorily to total profitability.
Banks can offer in principle five product categories: credit, securities, asset
management, financial services and insurance. Also, five client types can be
distinguished that banks can target: governmental clients (nation states, supra
national institutions), corporate clients, institutional clients (other banks, asset
managers and insurers), retail clients and private clients. The case studies
show that banks which entered new market activities actively serviced and
targeted a wide range of clients and products. Two specific patterns have been
identified: capital market activities, and foreign retail banking.
3.3.2 Capital market activities
For capital market activities banks offer credit, securities, asset management,
and financial advice to governmental, institutional and corporate clients. The
Realized internationalization strategies 27majority of the banks in the sample had set up such operations by 1980: they
participated in the Euromarkets, issued bonds to finance their own activities,
and took advantage of the financial deregulation in the financial centers.
Expanding capital market activities was spurred in the mid-1980s with the
financial liberalization in the United Kingdom, and in the mid-1990s with the
prospect of restructuring in the European Union.
For several banks, the decision to participate in the capital markets heavily
influenced their overall strategy. Paribas and J.P. Morgan decreased their
commercial banking activities and transformed themselves into investment
banks. Both banks however did not have the scale by the end of the 1990s to
remain a major market participant in investment banking and sustain the
increasing (IT) investments: J.P. Morgan was subsequently acquired by Chase
Manhattan in 2000, and Paribas by BNP in 1998. Most of the acquisitions of
UBS, SBC, Credit Suisse and Deutsche Bank in the 1990s were capital
market related, steadily increasing their reliance on fee income instead of net
interest income. The composition of the fee income changed: more lucrative
(but volatile) fee income from financial advice and securities (re)distributions
on mergers and acquisitions was combined with more stable income from
asset management activities.
Table 3.1. Development capital market activities
3.3.3 Retail banking
International retail banking has been the domain of a selected number of
banks. Chase and Citicorp set out to expand a retail network in Belgium, The
Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom in the 1950s and 1960s.
Period  1970s 1980s 1990s 
      
Reason    Growth Eurocurrency 
markets (London, 
Paris, Zurich) 
  Financial liberalization 
American stock market 




  Financial liberalization 
Japanese capital 
markets 
  Catch up new entrants 




      
Example 
Banks 
Chase, Citicorp    Deutsche Bank, ABN, 
Société Générale  
  Crédit Suisse, 
Deutsche Bank, 
J.P.Morgan  
      
28 Realized internationalization strategiesEuropean banks in the 1970s and 1980s on the other hand did not expand in
retail banking in Europe, but expanded in the United States, especially in
California where British and Japanese banks bought retail banks helped by
lenient regulation. For most Californian banks, their sale was either instigated
by regulation (banks that cannot be bought by domestic competitors due to an
increase in market share or banks that need outside capital) or poor
performance. By the early 1990s a large number of banks exited from the
United States market: they found it difficult to transform these banking
operations into profitable ones, and their exit was speeded by the deregulation
of interstate banking (cf. Tschoegl, 1987). The general expectation was that
this would raise the minimum scale of operations to compete effectively,
requiring large amounts of additional investments. Banks that remained were
for example HSBC and ABN Amro.
Figure 3.2 suggests a transition in foreign retail banking activities. Eight
foreign banks, including all of the British banks, held retail networks in the
United States in the early 1980s; by the late 1980s five had opted out. For
European banks, the growth of foreign commercial bank networks took place
from the mid-1980s. A limited number of banks (HSBC, ABN and Citicorp)
have maintained these foreign networks throughout the period. From the
1990s, the following banks pursued retail banking strategies:
● Santander in Argentina, Mexico, Chile
● BBVA in Argentina, Chile, Mexico
● ABN Amro in Brazil and the United States
● ING in Belgium
● HSBC in Mexico, Brazil, the United States/Canada and Hong Kong
● Citibank in Germany
Two groups of banks did not enter foreign retail banking, or only to a limited
extent: Swiss banks and Japanese banks. Swiss banks had retail banking
activities in their domestic market, but not outside Switzerland. Switzerland
was a major financial center and as an economy ran a capital surplus; an
explanation might be that setting up foreign capital market activities was
a more logical foreign extension of activities then setting up or acquiring
foreign retail banks. Japanese banks also entered foreign retail banking to
Realized internationalization strategies 29a limited extent. Their activities were mainly concentrated in California,
where the banks initially had some links with Japanese immigrants. More
important, lenient regulators allowed takeover of Californian banks by
foreign competitors. The existence of an opportunity set – the ability to buy –
compared to other more regulated banking markets has probably been the
main incentive.
Figure 3.2. Foreign commercial bank networks in selected countries, 1980–2003
3.3.4 Organizational form
Banks which decided to enter new markets or to strengthen their market
position have had a wide range of options available to them as to how they
could proceed in implementing their foreign banking activities. Looking back
at activities for the case studies, there has been a strong rise in the number of
each of the approaches used. Two specific developments in organizational
form have been identified: branch network, alliances and joint ventures.
30 Realized internationalization strategiesBranch network
In general, the objective to build a branch network has been to assist foreign
clients, finance activities more cheaply or to evade home country regulation.
Activities in financial centers were set up, usually starting with London, New
York and Singapore or Hong Kong. This was then expanded to second tier
financial centers and economic centers in Europe, the United States, Asia and
Latin America.
Table 3.2. Development of branch networks
Alliances and consortium banks
Consortium banks were mainly a feature of the late 1960s and 1970s. With
these joint ventures, banks tried to create a platform to service foreign clients
and undertake corporate finance activities, while sharing the costs of building
such an activity independently. In the beginning of the 1980s, there were
a number of banks who relied on the consortium banks to provide an
alternative for a foreign branch network. These were Amro and Midland.
Subsequently, a number of banks built their foreign networks by buying out
the other shareholders in the consortium banks.
During these alliances banks probably also acquired detailed information of
the partner banks. This could be concluded from the observation that ING
(un)successfully acquired former InterAlpha partners from the mid-1990s for
its expansion in Europe. From the 1990s, alliances between banks either had
to develop specific skills neither bank could achieve alone, or serve as
a defensive move in wake of expected restructuring in the European banking
market. This usually was accompanied by share exchanges.
Period 1970s 1980s  1990s 
      
Incentive    Breakdown 
consortium 
  Trade related, 
service existing 
clients 
  Increase trade and 
exports 
  Liberalization of 
capital markets 
  Opening up 
markets (Spain) 
  Growth Asian (capital) 
markets 
  Opening of Eastern 
European markets 
  Increase volume 
securities markers 
      
Example 
Banks 




  Amro, NMB, 
WestLB, Crédit 
Agricole 
  Deutsche Bank, 
Dresdner Bank 
      
Realized internationalization strategies 31Table 3.3. Selected Alliances between 1980 and 2000
The re-appearance of alliances and joint ventures in the 1990s was more
specific than in the 1970s and was also accompanied by mutual equity stakes.
Banks opted for mutual equity stakes to forge a stronger link with the other
bank than an alliance; the mutual equity stake effectively represented an
option to a first right to negotiate with the other bank when consolidation in
the (European) banking market was considered.
Internet Banks
From the late 1990s, the branchless Internet banks as an organizational form
gained importance. Internet banking was initially viewed as a cost saving
measure, providing the opportunity to close down branches while retaining
the bank’s customers. Other banks have developed Internet banking into a low
cost distribution form to expand in mature markets, such as ING Direct,
Comdirect or DB24. Other activities were less successful though. Aiming to
capture the high end of the consumer market, HSBC formed in 2000 a USD
1bn joint venture with US securities firm Merrill Lynch to offer online
brokerage services to wealthy clients. HSBC wanted to win new customers by
outsourcing research and brokerage services to Merrill. However, the activity
was quietly disbanded in 2003.
3.4 Realized internationalization strategies
To gain further insights in the realized internationalization strategies, 44 case
studies were developed, spanning 24 years. For each bank the individual
internationalization activities were tabulated and clustered to identify phases
in activities, the geographical area or region of activity, and additional
information about the clients, products and organization form used. The
world’s largest banks pursued different internationalization strategies
between 1980 and 2000. Banks retreated as well as increased their
internationalization activities. Roughly one quarter of the banks remained
Alliance to acquire or  
share specific skills 
Alliance to ensure (future)  
market position 
  
  Royal Bank of Scotland — 
Santander (1990-) 
  BNP-Dresdner (1988-2000) 
  Société Générale — BSCH (2000) 
  BBVA — UniCredito (2000) 
  Amro — Generale (1988) 
  Commerzbank — Banco Hispano 
Americano (1973, 1990) 
  
32 Realized internationalization strategiesinternationalized, one quarter retreated, while one quarter slowly and one
quarter strongly internationalized.
A bank’s strategy is determined by a large number of variables which cannot
be easily moulded into a framework (Canals, 1997). Walter (1988), Smith and
Walter (1997), and Canals (1997) have developed strategic frameworks for
banks. Smith and Walter (1997, pp. 401–436) developed a three dimensional
matrix, which can be drawn up for each banking organization: a client – arena
– product (C-A-P) matrix. The C-A-P classification is useful to analyze the
activities of a bank or any firm in general. Smith and Walter do not derive
general strategic typologies from their framework, although it builds on the
strategy research of Porter (1985). Banking “is a complex web of markets,
services and institutions that is not easily subjected to systematic analysis”
(Canals, 1997, p. 401). Instead, they state essential attributes to exploit
opportunities within the C-A-Pframework. These include the adequacy of the
institution’s capital base, the institutional risk base, quality of human
resources, its access to information and markets, its technology base and
managerial culture, and the entrepreneurial quality of its people.
Canals (1997, pp. 266–269) investigated internationalization strategies of
banks and presented an internationalization model which is based on three
main incentives, the combination of which he hypothesizes to be instrumental
for the internationalization of banks. In his view scale, customer service and
resource transfer are the main incentives for international activity. Canals
(1997, p. 250) further linked motives to organizational form of
internationalization activity. Alliances are the best way to transfer resources
or skills, and acquisitions are a modus operandi for increasing scale. If on the
other hand customer service is an important objective, then the development
of branches are quite likely. Canals stressed that “the strategic options banks
have open to them vary depending on their resources and their home country
[...]. The reason for this variety of strategic options is related not only to each
bank’s starting position, resources, skills, and weaknesses, but also to the
financial model in which it operates.” (Canals, 1997, p. 329).
The risk of simplifying strategic nuances may weigh up to the analytical
advantages of creating a comparative framework to develop general
observations. Although each framework has its merits, there is no general
framework which can be straightforwardly applied to internationalization
strategies for banks. Therefore, the strategic framework for
internationalization strategies in this study builds on the determination of
strategy phases developed by Fujita and Ishigaki (1986), and De Carmoy
Realized internationalization strategies 33(1990), combining banking strategies with strategic conduct into phases.
Within this framework, four major phases for internationalization activities
were identified: entry, expansion, consolidation and restructuring.
Additionally, we limit ourselves to the identification of realized strategic
activities compared to intended strategies (Mintzberg, Quinn, & Ghoshal,
1995): information on realized strategies is publicly available and the
measurement of realized strategies allows more comparisons between banks.
Table 3.4 show the phases; based on the case studies additional information
has been added in the right columns: the range of TNI during a phase and the
change in TNI during the phase.
Grouping banks on the basis of these phases and the resulting TNI development
led to five distinct types of realized internationalization strategies. In general,
a stylized strategy is bound to ignore specific choices that banks have made, but
on the other hand offers the advantage of defining commonalities in
internationalization activities more clearly. The five types are:
● Accelerating internationalization
Banks initially develop internationalization activities by setting up
branches in major economic and financial centers. As a next step
international activities are expanded by increasingly large foreign bank
acquisitions. Finally, the bank has to restructure, to consolidate the large
foreign acquisitions and to regain or increase its profitability.
● Moderate internationalization
In general, banks with Moderate internationalization strategies consider
internationalization as a support activity of the total bank organization. They
develop a foreign branch network and bank activities in major foreign
economic and financial centers; acquisitions and establishment of other
international bank activities are areaction to the internationalization activities
of other banks, especially banks with Accelerating strategies. Ultimately,
restructuring also sets in to consolidate activities and (re)gain profitability.
● Imploding internationalization
Fast increase of internationalization activities, to uphold or increase the
bank’s relative position compared to other competitors. Because the bank
is unable to control the large increase in international activities,
a prolonged financial crisis occurs. Finally, internationalization activities
are divested to raise capital; bank management (under pressure of
regulators) refocuses its activities on the domestic banking market.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































After a foreign financial or economic crisis, banks reassess their foreign
activities and shift their focus from international activities to domestic
activities. Foreign activities are divested to raise capital and/or domestic
banking activities are expanded, lowering the degree of
internationalization.
● Established internationalization
These are banks with a high degree of internationalization; the banks have
been historically committed to international activities, usually building up
international activities over a long period.
Table 3.5. Banks and their model of internationalization
The five types represent the internationalization of all banks in the sample,
and are classified in Table 3.5. Besides the two banks representing Imploding
internationalization, the number banks’ models of internationalization is
evenly spread between the other four types. Next, the stylized types of
realized internationalization strategies are discussed.
3.4.1 Accelerating internationalization
The first model fits banks that started internationalization at a moderate pace,
increasing the degree of internationalization in one or more subsequent steps,
after which a period of consolidation set in (Figure 3.3). In the first period
(stage A in Figure 3.3), the TNI generally moved between 10 and 20%.
Accelerating  Moderate  Imploding Retreating Established 
     
  HypoVereins 
bank 
  BCH 
  ING bank 
  ABN/Amro 
  NMB Bank 
  BBV 
  Paribas 
  Credit Suisse 
  Deutsche Bank 
  Dresdner Bank 
  Santander 
  UBS 
  WestLB 
  Argentaria 
  Amro 
  Fortis 
  Bayerische 
Hypobank 
  Vereinsbank 
  Agricole 
  Commerzbank 
  IBJ 
  Rabobank 
  Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
  Midland 
  Crédit Lyonnais 
  Manufacturers 
Hanovers 
  Chemical 
Banking 
  Mitsubishi 
Bank 
  Bank of 
America 
  Barclays 
  Chase 
Manhattan 
  Dai Ichi 
Kangyo 
  Lloyds TSB 
  National 
Westminster 
  Sumitomo Bank 
  Tokyo-
Mitsubishi 
  ABN 
  HSBC 
  Tokyo 
  SBC 
  JPMorgan 
  BNP 
  Citicorp 
  Société 
Générale 
  Standard 
Chartered 
 
       
36 Realized internationalization strategiesForeign activities comprised a branch network in main financial centers and
economic centers. For European banks, activities were set up in centers such
as Luxembourg, Switzerland, Paris and London to gain access to the
Euromarkets and more advantageous sources of finance than in the domestic
market. The bank’s objective has been to seek resources, acquire skills and
funding. Also, market seeking was an important objective, expanding the
existing services to be offered to domestic related clients in foreign countries.
This stage also includes banks who have actively participated in consortium
banks, building their branch networks in the late 1970s partly on the basis of
restructured or dissolved consortium bank networks.
Figure 3.3. Stylized model of accelerating internationalization
In the second stage (B), internationalization quickly gathered pace and TNI
reached levels between 20 and 40%. Weighing up between domestic and
international investments, banks increasingly chose international expansion.
Drivers for this change were in Europe the perceived convergence of financial
markets, forcing banks to acquire foreign activities to have aEuropean foothold
(just in case) and also to re-establish relative domestic positions. The change
Realized internationalization strategies 37from stage A to stage B is consistent with “obtaining a foothold strategy”.
Information about the foreign market is obtained by making small investments,
precursor of larger investments in the following years (Molyneux, 2003).
Anumber of banks have athird stage (C), accelerating the already strong growth
of internationalization activities. Here, the acquisitions get larger in size,
pushing TNI levels between 60 and 80%. The acquisitions in the second stage
probably have been integrated relatively smoothly. The increase took place for
a number of banks between 1995 and 2000 (ABN Amro, UBS, Credit Suisse);
the funding opportunities in the stock market might have helped as well.
The strong organizational changes in stages B and C have to be absorbed at
some point, signalling aconsolidation or restructuring period (D). Atrigger for
this could be threefold. First a financial crisis could force bank management
to reconsider its geography-product portfolio. For example, the Asian crises of
1998 made Barclays and ING (further) downscale their investment banking
activities, leaving shareholders with the impression the (geographic) span of
risk control was not an optimal one. Second, funding opportunities for further
expansion might be limited because the stock market is no longer a viable
option, forcing the bank to concentrate more on organic growth opportunities
than growth by acquisitions. Third, banks might have hit an
internationalization ceiling: raising internationalization above a certain level
raises questions like representativeness of the management board, and the
validity of the location of headquarters. In other words, raising the TNI above
a certain level might in some respects be a threat to sitting management.
Table 3.6. Major changes in TNI between 1980 and 2000
38 Realized internationalization strategiesBank management at this stage in general refocused: it redefined the
Client-Arena-Product areas (cf. Walter, 1988) it would like to excel, finding
that it acquired a number of activities in the previous years that would not fit
anymore in the bank organization. Key ratios as solvency, stability of
earnings, profitability and loan provisions become more important
management drivers, forcing divestments in some activities.
Deutsche Bank: accelerating internationalization strategy
Deutsche Bank fits the stereotype of the European bank in search of a truly
global strategy. As one of Europe’s largest banks, it has focused on
developing a retail bank presence in Europe in the 1980s, shifting to acquiring
a leading position in worldwide investments banking in the 1990s.
Initially, Deutsche Bank’s Accelerating internationalization strategy began by
setting up branches in major economic and financial centers. Next,
international activities were expanded by increasingly large foreign bank
acquisitions. Finally, a restructuring period set in, consolidating the large
foreign acquisitions and regain profitability.
1970s–1985: Entry in international banking markets.
Throughout the 1970s, Deutsche Bank systematically set up its branch
network world wide. This development was largely over in the early
1980s but Deutsche Bank continued to open branches or convert
representative offices to branches, though not with the intensity of the
“flag-planting competition” of British banks.
Realized internationalization strategies 391986–1998: Broad international expansion.
In 1986, Deutsche Bank started a reorganization to increase its market position in
securities trading, increase its presence in other high-growth international markets
and strengthen bank’s position in retail banking. Retail banking networks were
acquired in Italy (1986 and 1993), Spain (1993) and Belgium (1998). It was
unsuccessful in acquiring aretail network in France, and decided in 1999 to set up
15 branches for wealthy customers. The growth in the capital markets was
primarily accomplished in two large steps: the acquisition of Morgan Grenfell in
1989, and the acquisition of Bankers Trust in 1998. Subsequently, the
bank’s headquarters for its investment banking activities were transferred to
Morgan Grenfell in London. Deutsche Bank’s aim was to also to become
asizeable participant in the wholesale banking activities in the United States. This
was achieved with the sale of Bankers Trust to Deutsche Bank in 1998.
1999–2004: Restructuring.
Increasing its German market share was a permanent issue for Deutsche Bank
in the 1990s. It unsuccessfully negotiated a merger with domestic competitor
Dresdner Bank in 1999, failing to agree on integrating their investment
banking activities. The restructuring of domestic operations had to be done
alone, and Deutsche Bank created “Deutsche Bank 24”, its retail banking unit,
by combining retail and direct bank activities (clicks and bricks) in 1999.
After restructuring, profitability increased in 2000, and the bank moved away
from the concept that retail banking was a costly but necessary burden for the
bank. Further cost reduction was pursued by the intended joint venture with
Dresdner’s and HVB’s backoffices. Opportunities to expand in the domestic
market, to counter the volatile investment banking source of income, were
often debated (such as the Postbank IPO) but not seized. In the absence of
potential partners in Germany’s fragmented banking market, Deutsche would
have to look to one of its European peers, as indicated by its chairman. Also,
management focus was distracted by the Mannesmann trial. 
3.4.2 Moderate internationalization
Banks with a stable growth of internationalization activities tend to
consistently increase their TNI over time. Here too, the first stage is the build
up of a branch network, with levels of TNI remaining between 10 and
20 percent. Where other banks accelerate their growth, mostly by acquisitions,
these banks prefer to continue a strategy combining greenfields and/or small
acquisitions. In some cases they are simply restricted by earlier actions
(Commerzbank internationalization activities lagged behind its domestic
40 Realized internationalization strategiescompetitors because it had accumulated less reserves in the 1980s) or focus:
Argentaria was created as a domestic oriented bank, and Rabobank had
a strong domestic base. At some point, usually when the acceleration in
internationalization activities took place for the Accelerating banks, these
banks also attempted to catch up with their competitors and strongly increase
their foreign activities. Rabobank set up an investment banking unit in London
in 1995, and Commerzbank, previously focused on Europe, set out to buy
aT aiwanese bank. At this stage, TNI generally moved between 20 and 40%.
Figure 3.4. Stylized model of moderate internationalization
Reorientation with these banks generally took place ahead of restructuring
with Accelerating banks: the low degree of internationalization is probably
caused by a more risk-averse approach to foreign activities, allowing little
room to absorb more volatile results. Also, a relatively late acceleration of
internationalization activities might have soon created the awareness that size
or infrastructure to effectively compete in markets with other banks could not
be achieved without considerable amount of investments. A reorientation
takes place (C), focusing on its core activities. Rabobank down-scaled its
investment banking activities and focused on agricultural finance as an
international niche strategy, aligning its international activities with its
domestic strengths. Commerzbank set out to keep a confined geographic
scope, maintaining a European branch network to support its German clients.
Realized internationalization strategies 41Rabobank: moderate internationalization strategy
Dutch based Rabobank is a diversified financial services organization with
a cooperative status. Founded in 1972, the bank has a strong domestic base,
and builds on its agricultural roots in its foreign expansion strategies.
The Rabobank is representative for banks with a moderate
internationalization strategy: to a large degree, internationalization is
considered as a support activity of the total bank organization.
1980s: broad international expansion.
Foreign activities to serve its domestic clients formed the core of its
internationalization strategy in the 1970s and 1980s. To join the international
capital market operations, Rabobank set up activities in London and New
York. Rabobank actively participated in consortium banks and alliances, with
UNICO as a linking pin within this strategy.
1990–1995: broad domestic and international expansion.
In the 1990s, the bank moved towards a bankassurance model acquiring
insurer Interpolis and asset manager Robeco. It was the basis for a three pillar
strategy: in the home market, Rabobank built its organization into a broad
financial service provider, strengthening the retail, corporate finance and asset
management side, remaining loyal to the legacy of earlier decades. Rabobank
strengthened ties with existing UNICO partners, especially German DG bank
and Spanish bank Banco Popular.
42 Realized internationalization strategies1996–1998: Increased international expansion.
The rising costs of the foreign branch network forced a reorientation, and in
1996 the bank decided to provide corporate, investment and private banking
services to clients in the agricultural, pharmaceutical and food industries in
the major regions, initiating a string of acquisitions worldwide. Somewhat
more opportunistic, its London branch was heavily upgraded in 1997 into an
investment banking department, trying to reap the fruits of booming securities
markets. Investment banking was scaled down in 1999 after disappointing
results.
1999–2002: Restructuring.
However, Rabobank suffered a string of setbacks forcing it to reconsider its
strategy: two announced large scale mergers fell through and its investment
banking activities delivered poor results. In 1998 Rabobank unsuccessfully
contemplated a full-fledged merger with Achmea. An alternative, to combine
the investment banking activities with DG Bank in a joint venture, fell
through. Also, the domestic cost efficiency was lagging in comparison with
other competitors. These events signalled a period where management
reconsidered the bank’s strategy, and in anticipation of a new direction cost
cutting measures were announced.
2003– : Refocused expansion
Asset management heralded the continued commitment to international
operations when Rabobank bought two American asset managers and a hedge
fund boutique in 2001 and 2002, as well as a small Swiss private bank. In
2004 Rabobank agreed to co-operate with pan-European insurer Eureko, in
a deal initially restricted to health insurance. In Poland a large financial
participation in the leading agricultural banks BGZ was acquired, while in
India the bank took an equity stake in an Indian retail bank. The bank faced
resistance however when it announced its intention to acquire US based Farm
Credit Services. The bank’s commitment to further international growth is
still unwavering; its chairman predicted early 2005 that in 10 years “our
international side will be bigger than our Dutch side”. 
3.4.3 Imploding internationalization
Jean Deflassieux, senior international officer at Crédit Lyonnais in 1980, said
that banking internationalization is “a bit like bicycling: if you stop going you
fall off” (Lewis, 1980). A strong rise and decline of internationalization
between 1980 and 2000 applies to two banks: Crédit Lyonnais and Midland
Realized internationalization strategies 43Bank. Within a short period, foreign activities were acquired to achieve status
(stage A): Crédit Lyonnais aimed to achieve a similar market position as
Deutsche Bank in the European banking market, while Midland felt it lagged
in internationalization activities after years of consortium banking and
alliances, and wanted a major foreign acquisition to be at par with the other
British banks.
The rise in internationalization and change in market-position came in both
cases at a cost: the bank organization became uncontrollable, its problems
surfacing in stage B. For example, management of United States Crocker
Bank did not give its owner, Midland, full insight in its financial statements
(Rogers, 1999). Midland was not able, and perhaps did not press hard, to gain
disclosure about how its capital injection was spent. The influx of capital in
Crocker created unbalanced loan growth, and poor disclosure meant that risks
similar to Crocker and Midland were not controlled for the total organization.
Crédit Lyonnais had similar problems: it did not have an administrative
organization in place to manage the operational risk that was increasing with
each additional foreign acquisition.
Figure 3.5. Stylized model of imploding internationalization
44 Realized internationalization strategiesThe decline of internationalization for both banks was a forced exit, as sudden
as its entry. Midland had to take large provisions for the losses at Crocker,
damaging Midland’s solvency which was only stopped when Crocker was
sold at a large loss. Crédit Lyonnais had to sell its European subsidiaries in
return for state aid. After this, both banks their independence was ended. The
restructuring of Midland was undertaken by HSBC from 1992; the French
government restructured Crédit Lyonnais from 1998, and redistributed its
shares in a public offering in 2000 making it clear it would not object
a (domestic) takeover.
3.4.4 Retreating internationalization
Retreating banks have already acquired high levels of internationalization in
an earlier period. They have built a branch network supporting their domestic
clients, but also other activities like commercial bank networks. The decline
of internationalization is triggered by a crisis; for American and British banks
in the early 1980s this was the LDC crises.
Banks then began a period of reorientation: their main concern is to stop the
loss making activities, depressing their profitability, solvency as well as their
market value. American banks reduced their LDC exposure throughout the
1980s, while playing an active role in the loan restructuring committees until
1985 to salvage some of the loans. Regulatory authorities tended to play an
active role, stimulating the decrease in foreign activities because they more
domestic mergers and acquisitions to achieve scale and more cost-cutting
opportunities.
This hastened the decline in TNI in stage B (see Figure 3.6). This also
suggests that internationalization was not the preferred growth strategy for
these banks in the first place. This is especially the case for American banks,
when the regulation on interstate banking was lifted, allowing domestic
mergers.
Realized internationalization strategies 45Figure 3.6. Stylized model of retreating internationalization
After a period of consolidation, working through the domestic merger, bank
management became interested again in internationalization. Chase
Manhattan bought J.P. Morgan in 2000 to this end, Bank of America set up
investment banking activities in London from 1999 onwards, and domestic
oriented banks like Lloyds announced that it might once again reconsider
international activities in 2000.
46 Realized internationalization strategiesCrédit Lyonnais: imploding internationalization strategy
Crédit Lyonnais, a state owned bank, dramatically increased its
internationalization efforts in the 1980s, aiming to become the largest
diversified European bank and overtaking Deutsche Bank’s role. A financial
crisis eventually emerged because of poor management. The bank
restructured with state aid, and eventually was acquired by Crédit Agricole.
Crédit Lyonnais experienced an Imploding internationalization strategy. After
a financial crisis in the early 1990s, the bank reassessed its foreign activities
and had to shift its focus from international activities to domestic activities.
Foreign activities were divested to raise capital, lowering the degree of
internationalization.
1980–1984: Broad international expansion.
The internationalization of Crédit Lyonnais was well underway since the
1970s, establishing a network in Latin America, Africa and for a short while
the Middle East. Branches in the major financial centers were created, and
capital market activities expanded.
1985–1993: Increased international expansion.
Crédit Lyonnais embraced a universal banking concept: while the bank aimed
for an important role in the financing as well as control of industrial
companies. It believed in the need to be present in European countries, either
Realized internationalization strategies 47through internal growth or by buying foreign banks. The expansion of Crédit
Lyonnais was directed by government; the bank expanded abroad to assist
state-owned industrial firms as they sought to compete outside France. It
acquired a score of banks and industrial holdings between 1989 and 1992 in
Europe; this aggressive strategy proved to be a risky one after the economic
slowdown in 1992. Industrial holdings and property loans generated heavy
losses. Insufficiently controlled subsidiaries caused serious setbacks both in
France and abroad. After a change of management, staff was cut, operations
streamlined and assets sold. Mounting heavy losses forced the French
government to rescue the bank, first in early 1994 and then in April 1995.
1994–2000: Restructuring, refocus and international exit.
The government provided financial assistance which probably worsened the
situation, and the bank ran into further trouble in 1996. A financial
restructuring plan was finally agreed on with the French government and
approved by the European Commission in 1998. This plan included
scheduling major sales of foreign assets as well as the privatization of the
bank by October 1999. In subsequent years however Crédit Lyonnais still had
to cope with the aftermath of its ill fated acquisition strategy, such as the
disputed acquisition of insurer Executive Life.
The public offering of shares took place in 1999, with Crédit Agricole
controlling a 10% equity stake. In 2003 Crédit Lyonnais was fully acquired
by Crédit Agricole in a domestic consolidation move, ahead of BNP Paribas
who also had built up an equity stake and shown interest to acquire the whole
bank. The Agricole-Lyonnais combination controls about a third of the
country’s retail bank business.
48 Realized internationalization strategiesBank of America: retreating internationalization strategy
The initially California based Bank of America was in the 1970s a bank with
a large worldwide presence. In 20 years, the bank transformed into broad
financial service provider, with a predominant domestic focus caused by
foreign divestitures and large domestic mergers with Nationsbank (1998) and
recently FleetBoston (2003).
The internationalization strategy of Bank of America has been retreating:
after the foreign loan crises in the emerging markets in the early 1980s, the
bank reassessed its foreign activities and shifted its focus from international
activities to domestic activities. Foreign activities were divested to raise
capital and/or domestic banking activities expanded, lowering the degree of
internationalization.
1980: Financial crisis.
The asset seeking strategy of the 1970s and early 1980s had major flaws:
operating expenses were hard to control, management had difficulties coping
with the organization, and the foreign expansion turned out to be
over-ambitious, having lent considerably to LDCs.
1980s: Foreign retreat, domestic restructuring.
Large losses between 1985 and 1987 forced a restructuring program with
three goals. First, the retail and commercial banking units were strengthened,
Realized internationalization strategies 49since BankAmerica had an extensive distribution network. Second, poorly
performing lending activities were divested or cut back. Third, international
activities were cut back. The number of European staff decreased from 7,500
to 1,700 in 1994, the number of Latin American countries it was active in
decreased from 20 to 6. After cutting costs and restructuring bad loans, the
bank returned to profit in 1988 and steadily increased its financial
performance.
1992–2000: Increasing domestic expansion.
In 1990 the operations of Bank of America were expanded into seven other
states by acquiring thrifts. In acquiring Security Pacific, Bank of America
increased its position in California, increasing total assets by 56%. The bank
acquired additional banks and mortgage businesses, and in 1994 Continental
Bank was bought. Bank of America and Nationsbank announced their merger
in 1998.
2000: Renewed international orientation?
The Russian crisis and the merger activities between Nationsbank and
BankAmerica led the bank in early 1999 to restructure its foreign activities,
selling its private banking operations in Europe and Asia to UBS, and its
consumer banking business in Asia to ABN Amro. Simultaneously, it
announced that it planned to expand its securities activities in at home as well
as in the United Kingdom, attempting to build it up internally.
2003: Continued domestic expansion and foreign retreat
Instead of re-expanding internationally, the bank anticipated on further
regional integration with Mexico, buying part of Serfin, Mexico’s third
largest bank from Spanish SCH. Its commitment to other foreign activities
such as in Japan was reassessed a few months later, scaling back its capital
market operations there. Finally, in 2003 Bank of America acquired
FleetBoston, making it the third largest banks by assets (and deposits) in the
United States. The share of foreign operations dropped under 8% compared
from almost 50% in 1980, evidence of the strong transformation the bank has
experienced.
3.4.5 Established internationalization
Accelerating, Moderate and Imploding internationalization have in common
that initially the level of TNI was low: the bank had to acquire a market
position in international banking, and had three routes to choose from. For
50 Realized internationalization strategiesRetreating and  Established internationalization, the bank’s initial position
was different. The level of TNI was high, and while Retreating banks chose
to focus on domestic activities, Established banks continued their
commitment to international activities, maintaining a TNI level between 30
and 50%. This was the case for J.P. Morgan, Citicorp and HSBC in the
1980s and 1990s, or ABN in the 1980s.
Established banks were not immune to change: economic and financial crises,
and shifting focus on international banking activities led at time to
restructuring activities. However, the banks typically did not decrease their
TNI by more than 10 percent, illustrating their commitment to foreign
banking activities. This also indicates that the banks have in general balanced
international and domestic growth of banking activities.
Figure 3.7. Stylized model of established internationalization
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HSBC began its internationalization strategy as a HongKong based bank with
close ties to the United Kingdom. Expanding in several countries, the bank
moved its headquarters to the United Kingdom in 1991 by acquiring Midland
Bank. Its worldwide presence as a large diversified banking organization was
enhanced in the 1990s by buying banking activities in Brazil and in the United
States.
HSBC, a bank with an Established internationalization strategy, has
historically upheld a high degree of internationalization. Historically
committed to international activities, HSBC has built up international
activities over a long period.
1980–1992: Broad expansion.
In the late 1970s and into the 1980s, China began to open up for foreign
business. The bank bought operations in the United States (notably Marine
Midland) and Canada, initially to capitalize on business between China and the
United States and Canada, much of which was transacted through Hong Kong
since China lacked financial infrastructure until the 1980s. HSBC was located
in HongKong, uncertainty about its return to China led HSBC to gain a major
foothold in the United Kingdom. In 1987, pressed to reduce its independence
on Hong Kong, it took an equity stake in Midland. Midland Bank was purchased
in 1992 and – as part of the agreement to buy Midland – in 1993 HSBC formed
HSBC holdings, transferring its headquarters from Hong Kong to London.
52 Realized internationalization strategies1993–: Broad expansion.
The strategy of HSBC in the mid 1990s has been to build the world’s biggest
financial services group, presenting itself as a contender of Citigroup. HSBC
took a different approach to investment banking than competitors like J.P.
Morgan, and Deutsche Bank, building a far more modest investment banking
unit, emulating Barclays Capital Market activities. HSBC began to expand
further in Asia, expanding in Malaysia and China. In 1997 it expanded in
South America, buying banks in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru. In 1999
it bought a controlling stake in South Korea’s government-owned Seoulbank.
It also bought Republic New York and Safra Republic Holdings, doubling
HSBC’s private banking business and adding 426 branches in New York
State. In 2000, HSBC bought Credit Commercial de France for 11 billion
euros, adding 1 million French customers and completing Europe’s largest
ever cross-border banking acquisition. Also in 2000, HSBC formed a USD
1 billion US dollar joint venture with US securities firm Merrill Lynch to offer
online brokerage services to wealthy clients.
The bank further increased its foothold in the United States with the
acquisition in 2002 of Household, the consumer finance group, for about
15 billion US dollar – HSBC’s largest purchase until then. Further
acquisitions were eyed, especially in China and South East Asia, the
traditional stronghold of HSBC. Early 2005, the bank expanded its global
branding strategy by renaming French CCF.
3.5 Characteristics of realized internationalization strategies
The typologies are based on observations about realized strategies. In other
words, the observation of what a bank actually has done has been the basis for
identifying the different realized internationalization types. The different
strategy types have a long time period in common spanning twenty years,
which might be considered a long time for a strategy. Such a long time period
is not uncommon. One of the path breaking management studies in the
1980sby Peters and Waterman, “In search of Excellence”, examined American
(non-financial) companies between 1961 and 1980 (Peters & Waterman,
1982). Another example is Collins and Portas (1993), who in 1989 studied
a sample of American companies founded before 1945 to analyse their long
term performance. Along term horizon also has some implications: the bank is
in the analyses treated as an organization with a sense of historical memory;
changes or events in the past bear their mark on strategic thinking today.
Realized internationalization strategies 53Figure 3.8. TNI per strategy type, unweighted average
Figure 3.8 shows the unweighted TNI averages per strategic type. Established
banks show the highest TNI throughout the period, only to be surpassed by
Accelerating banks in 2000. On the lower end are the Moderate banks,
showing the lowest average TNI throughout the period to be surpassed by the
Retreated banks in 1998. Accelerating and Retreated banks are negatively
related: for the Accelerating banks TNI increased, especially after 1989.
Retreated banks show steadily declining levels of TNI, from 1983 onwards.
Table 3.7 presents a number of key figures per strategy and per five year
period. Although Accelerating and Retreated banks are different strategies,
they seem to have had similar growth targets: the average asset size in
1995–2000 is similar for Accelerating, Retreated and Established banks.
For the 1990s, Retreated and Established banks have been better capitalized,
but also had higher loan provisions than Accelerating banks. Moderate banks
have had a relatively high degree of provisions in 1981–1985, probably
leading to the relatively low capitalization of the banks during that period.
This may be partly responsible for the low degree of internationalization:
these banks did not have the financial cushions (anymore) in the early
1980s to engage in international activities. If herding has taken place in the
1990s, then it surely was a risk-controlled one: exits were more swiftly
decided on than with other bank types.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































sFinally, we examined whether herding applies to the five different realized
internationalization strategy types. An incentive identified in chapter 3 to
internationalize was herding. Herding takes place when a bank imitates the
actions of other banks; the bank must be aware of and be influenced by other
banks’ actions (Bikhchandani & Sharma, 2000). A herding incentive might
exist if other banks may know something about the return of foreign bank
activities that the bank does not know; the bank may also have an intrinsic
preference for conformity and follow (domestic) competitors.
To see whether the realized internationalization strategies are concentrated,
Table 3.8 shows banks in the sample, grouped per country and per realized
internationalization strategy. Established and Retreating internationalization
strategies tend to be concentrated with American, British and Japanese banks,
while  Moderate and  Accelerating realized strategies tend to be clustered
around German, Dutch, Spanish and Swiss banks. This supports the notion
that herding on a country level might exist.
Table 3.8. Realized internationalization strategies, per country
United 
States
United Kingdom Japan France Germany Netherlands Spain Switzerland
Paribas Deutsche Bank ING Bank BCH Credit Suisse
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56 Realized internationalization strategies4P r ofitability and shareholder value
4.1 Introduction
Through internationalization, a bank might aim to improve its profitability, or
realize more stable profitability through geographical diversification. The
goal of this chapter is to determine if international activities have delivered
a better performance than home country activities, and what relationships
exist between performance measures of banks and TNI. There are several
performance measures which can be evaluated, leading to the presentation of
a number of analyses. First, the relationship between profitability and
internationalization is tested, after shareholder return is included in the
analyses.
4.2 Relationship between profitability and internationalization
Have banks become more profitable through internationalization, and have
shareholders gained by it? To get an answer to this question, the relationship
between the degree of internationalization and performance was analyzed.
4.2.1 Hypothetical relationships
The relationship between internationalization and performance has been
extensively investigated, focusing on two research questions. Is there
a relationship, and if so, what is the shape of that relationship? Organizations
might show learning effects when their commitment and involvement in
foreign activities increase, resulting in different benefit-cost trade off pay-offs
for the organization.
4 In the last decade, researchers have developed different
scenarios for explanation, hypothesizing two primary non-linear curve types:
quadratic (J, U, inverted J, inverted U) and cubic.
The J curve assumes that over time banks can learn to minimize the additional
costs associated with foreign expansion. (cf. Ruigrok and Wagner, 2003). This
means that internationalization costs outweigh benefits until banks gain
experience and learn to deal with them. Consequently, banks will reach an
57
4 The following paragraphs about the shape of internationalisation lean heavily on Ruigrok
and Wagner (2003).inflexion point along the expansion path at which incremental benefits start to
outweigh incremental costs. This is visualized as a J- or U-curve. This
scenario implies that bank undergo a period of performance deterioration
before experimental knowledge can lead to higher performance levels.
On the other hand, an opposite J- or U-curve can be hypothesized, arguing
that banks do not need to explicitly address initial internationalization costs
through organizational learning, but deploy their home based skills and
resources to achieve economies of scale and/or scope, without large cost
increases. Thus, at the start of internationalization, the incremental benefits of
internationalization should outweigh the incremental costs. However, as
banks intensify their foreign expansion, not only do coordination and
monitoring costs increase exponentially and become difficult to address
through organizational learning, but learning costs may outweigh value
generated. In other words, an internationalization threshold is identified at the
point where incremental costs of internationalization start to outweigh
incremental benefits, implying that banks should not overstep this (degree of)
foreign expansion.
Besides a J or U curve, a horizontal S shape has also been proposed to explain
the link between performance and internationalization, aiming to reconcile
the conflicting quadratic curve types. Here, two types of costs associated with
internationalization are identified. Type I costs are fixed and modest costs at
low degrees of internationalization, stemming from the liabilities of
foreignness and newness: unfamiliarity with trade laws, consumer
ethnocentricity, new consumer tastes and cross-cultural communication costs.
Type 2 costs, visible at high degrees of internationalization stem from the
significant coordination and monitoring demands caused by intense market
complexity, dynamism and uncertainty. The horizontal S logic argues that
learning to address the Type I costs is necessary and cost effective, but
learning to successfully manage extreme levels of internationalization (Type
2 costs) is not. Banks should aim at learning to deal with initial costs of
foreign expansion but avoid extreme levels of foreign market dependence.
Ruigrok and Wagner (2003) conducted a meta analysis of the relationship
between performance and internationalization. Using data from 62 studies,
covering 174 samples, they found empirical support for a non-zero, positive
impact at the aggregate level. As to the form of that relationship, no clear
conclusions could be drawn.
58 Profitability and shareholder value4.2.2 Internationalization of banks and performance
On a basic level, we can define the relationship between internationalization
and performance as
pT = f(w, pF, pH) (1)
Where p is profit before tax as a percentage of total assets, the subscripts
denote (T)otal, (F)oreign, and (H)ome. w is defined as foreign assets as
a percentage of total assets. Whether w, pF, pH are related or not, the
accounting definition holds by definition, stating that total profits before tax
is an asset weighted average of foreign, and domestic profits before tax:
pT = w ⋅  pF + (1–w) ⋅  pH (2)
Equation (2) is a simple test for the linear relationship between profitability
and internationalization. If pF > pH we should observe a linear, upward sloping
relationship between total profitability (pT) and the degree of
internationalization (w). The opposite holds for pF < pH. In other words, not
assuming any learning effects or economies of scale exploitation leads to
a hypothesized linear relationship between internationalization and
performance. Theoretically, we could observe 4 different combinations of
relationships. These are shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1. Hypothesized relationship between profitability and internationalization







      
1. pF > pH  ) w f( pT
+
=  
Positive internationalization effects.  Resource 
based asset seeking, or seeking new 
clients/markets. Geographic diversification 
advantages might apply. 
      
2. pF > pH  ) w f( pT
￿
=  
While foreign activities are more profitable, 
managerial and overhead costs of integrating 
them in the organization outweigh 
internationalization benefits.  
      
3. pF < pH  ) w f( pT
+
=  
Support strategy. Foreign activities are loss 
making, but support total profitability. 
Resource based asset seeking, or seeking new 
clients/markets. Geographic diversification 
advantages might apply. 
      
4. pF < pH  ) w f( pT
￿
=  
Other motives to internationalize: gaining 
market share fast, having a long term 
acquisition horizon.  
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profitability – in other words, is pF > pH. We do not assume, or test for specific
J, S or U curve relationships between internationalization and performance.
We examine in 5.3 the relationship between total profitability and the degree
of internationalization, and identify a possible shape.
4.3 Is foreign profitability higher than domestic?
To  test whether pF > pH, the following analysis focuses on differences in
profitability based on reported data by banks (actual figures for a smaller
number of banks). Banks have published this information to a limited degree.
In 1980, 15 out of 44 banks reported such information, increasing to 20 out
of 44 in 2000. Incidental reporting by for example Deutsche Bank has been
left out, as have incidental reporting for Rabobank, NMB Bank and Tokyo
Bank. A second analysis is then set up to analyze differences in performance
for the whole sample with estimated figures for the whole sample. An
alternative measures is developed here for foreign and domestic profitability,
using benchmark profitability data and asset weightings.
Table 4.2. Data availability of domestic and foreign profitability
Country  Bank, period of data availability 
  
France  CrØdit Agricole (1992-2003), BNP (1982-2003), CrØdit Lyonnais (1983-2002), 
SociØtØ GØnØrale (1983, 1987-2003) 
 
Germany  Commerzbank (1995-2003), Deutsche Bank (na), Bayerische Hypobank (na), 
Dresdner Bank (1997-2003), Hypovereinsbank (1998-2003), Vereinsbank (1992-
1997), Westdeutsche Landesbank (na) 
 
Spain  Argentaria (na), BBV (na), BBVA (na), BCH (na), Santander (na), BSCH (na) 
 




Barclays (1980-2003), HSBC (1992-2003), Lloyds/TSB (1980-2003), Midland 
(1980-1991), National Westminster (1980-2003), Standard Chartered (1980-2003) 
 
Netherlands  ABN (1980-1989), ABN Amro (1990-2003), Amro (na), Fortis (1996-2003), ING 
Bank (1992-2003), NMB (na), Rabobank (na) 
 
United States  Bank of America (1980-1997), Chase Manhattan (1980-2003), Chemical Banking 
(1984-1995), Citicorp (1980-2003), J.P. Morgan (1980-1999), Manufacturers 
Hanover (1980-1990) 
 
Japan  Dai Ichi Kangyo (1994-2003), IBJ (1994-2003), Mitsubishi Bank (1987-1995), 
Sumitomo Bank (1997-2003), Tokyo Mitsubishi (1996-2003), Tokyo Bank (na)  
  
  
na: not available      
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with ageographic dimension is profit before tax as ashare of total assets; Table
4.2 presents the banks that have reported longer series of foreign and domestic
profitability. Information before 1990 leans strongly on the information
provided by British and American banks, and to a lesser extent on French
banks. It cannot be stated that when internationalization became more
important for banks, they started to report more internationalization-related
information in their financial reports. Banks like SBC, UBS or Deutsche Bank
did not report this information although they progressed significantly with
their internationalization activities. A general remark is usually found in the
financial report stating something like “due to the integrated nature of our
activities worldwide a geographical breakdown does not provide additional
information”; the information provided by British and American banks in the
1980s proves otherwise. Difference in profitability between foreign and home
activities (pD) is calculated as:
pD = pF – pH (3)
The relative size of foreign activities does not influence the value of pD; the
difference in profitability does not change if the bank has 1% or 10% foreign
assets.
In total 34 out of 44 banks have reported at some time foreign and domestic
profitability figures for three or more years between 1980 and 2003; 10 banks
have not reported such figures. Of these 34 banks, 19 have shown a negative
difference in profitability (Figure 4.1). When banks show a negative
difference in profitability, is this caused by a relatively lower profitability of
foreign activities or a relatively higher profitability of domestic activities? To
answer this, a scatter plot is presented in Figure 4.2. On the vertical axis, the
difference between foreign and domestic profitability is shown (pD), and on
the horizontal axis the total profitability is shown.
Profitability and shareholder value 61Figure 4.1. Differences in reported foreign and domestic profitability, for variable
time periods
Figure 4.2: Scatter diagram between difference in foreign and domestic profitability,
and difference in domestic and average domestic profitability
62 Profitability and shareholder valueThe relationship presented in Figure 4.2 is negatively sloped with
a correlation of –.59 (p<.01, n=30). There is one outlier, Fortis, reporting
a relatively higher difference between foreign and domestic profitability than
would have been expected given the general negative relationship. An
explanation for this might be the relatively favorable period of reporting for
Fortis, between 1996 and 2003. The scatter plot indicates that in general pD is
negatively related to total profitability, if we cluster the results we find
different relationships for countries. For Japanese banks, pD is on average
positive while pT is negative. This suggests that Japanese banks need foreign
activities to support their total profitability. On the other hand, for continental
European banks pD is on average negative while pT is positive: foreign
banking activities seem to have depressed total profitability for European
banks. Mixed results are found for – mostly – American and British banks:
their total profitability is high, but the variance of pD is also high.
The negative relationship suggests that a relative positive domestic
performance is not necessarily related to a relatively successful foreign
performance. It suggests that lagging domestic performance might have been
an incentive for some banks to internationalize since additional performance
is relatively more easy to achieve outside the home country than within.
5 It
can also be interpreted another way: some banks with relatively high
domestic performance (Credit Suisse, Barclays) perhaps have the buffers and
reserves to sustain relatively lower foreign performance.
The observed negative relationship between pD and the relative domestic
performance is difficult to generalize, due to differences between time periods
of banks. Banks who reported on average a negative pD did this during an
average length of 13.6 years compared to 8.6 for banks reporting a positive
pD: the difference in years is a combination of not reporting the figures, and
the higher number of mergers in the 1990s, limiting the maximum reporting
period for some banks. A better approach would be to consider the
information per year for the sample. Figure 4.3 shows the mean and median
difference in foreign and domestic profitability between 1980 and 2000.
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5 This explanation is partly included in the small home market incentive: due to a small home
market, growth opportunities and opportunites to exploit economies are limited decreasing
profitability and increasing the incentive to internationalise.Figure 4.3. Difference foreign and home profitability
Of the 21 years, the median value is negative for 11 years. The
representativeness of the banks who reported foreign and domestic
profitability compared to the sample increased throughout the period: before
1990 not more than 16 banks reported these figures, increasing to 22 in 2000.
The highly negative values for pD between 1987 and 1989 are followed by
a short period of high pD values between 1990 and 1994. The values from
1980 to 1987 and 1994 to 2000 remain closer to zero. pD does not differ
significantly from zero for the whole sample.
Figure 4.3 shows that pD in 1987 or 1989 differs substantially from the other
pD values. This can be explained by the large provisions banks had to take in
1987 and 1989, since securities activities were mainly concentrated in
financial centers (outside the home country for a number of banks). Another
explanation is the large provisioning in 1987 banks booked to write off LDC
loans, led by Citibank after six years of unresolved negotiations to reschedule
LDC debt. Two years later, LDC write offs were once again large when the
Baker plan led to a final agreement to end the LDC crisis for banks.
To determine in which years pD showed values significantly different from
zero, a regression model has been estimated with pD as the independent
variable, and the year dummies as independent variables. The estimated
model is pDijt = γ tTt + ε ijt. Dependent variables are the year dummies (Tt). The
results are shown in the following table:
64 Profitability and shareholder valueTable 4.3. Estimated Dummy Regression model, pD as dependent variable
Estimated coefficients with p values < .05 were 1987, 1989, 1992 and 1993.
From 1983 to 1989, foreign activities were on average less profitable,
especially since 1987. A financial recovery period was visible in the early
1990s, especially in 1992 and 1993. This suggests that timing has been
important: banks that have increased their international activities significantly
in the early 1990s should have enjoyed above average returns, while banks
who established international activities in the 1980s will have experienced
rebounding foreign profitability. On the same note, an exit from international
banking in the early 1990s will have meant that “recovery advantages” were
not reaped, while exiting or expanding from 1995 will not on average have
changed performance for better or for worse. The conclusion is then that for
the banks who have reported geographic distribution of profits:
● Performance of foreign activities is lower than domestic, but does not
differ significantly from zero.
● The negative performance difference is concentrated around 1987 and
1989.
● Entry and exit moments matter for the total profitability of the
international activities.
4.4 Relationship between internationalization and total
profitability?
The previous test focused on the relationship between foreign and domestic
profitability where the relative weight of foreign or domestic activities exerted
no influence. The next test determines if internationalization is positively related
to a higher performance. This is tested in two steps: does such a relationship exit
for the individual banks in the sample between 1980 and 2000. Next, does such
a relationship exist for the whole sample? A straightforward approach is to
evaluate one variable regression model per bank
Dummy 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Coefficient 0.1480 0.1340 0.1370 -0.1730 -0.3080 -0.5180 -0.1380 -2.818** -0.3640 -2.605** 0.2950 0.5170
N1 1 1 1 1 2 1 41 51 31 3 1 61 61 61 6 1 5
Dummy 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Coefficient 1.129** 0.854** 0.2460 0.1030 0.2790 0.1660 0.1090 0.0384 0.0944 0.1140 -0.0247 0.2200
N1 8 1 8 2 0 2 22 22 32 2 2 32 22 22 0 2 1
F(24,410) = 6.761**, adjusted R Square = .242.
**: p value < .01; *: p value < .05
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The dependent variable is profit before tax as percentage of capital and
reserves; TNI is the independent variable. The constant  in the model
represents the level of profitability if the bank would not have
internationalized (TNI=0). This test focuses on the direction of coefficient β .
If β is negative (positive), then a higher degree of internationalization is
associated with lower (higher) profitability. The number of observations
varies per bank, so the significance of β provides less information and is
ignored here. At the most, 21 observations per bank can be found, while on
the lower side at most 3 observations per bank can be observed. Table 4.4
presents the estimated coefficient β per bank, in combination with the
adjusted R-Square and the p value for β .
There are 44 banks in the sample, of which 25 show a negative relationship
between TNI and profit before tax as a percentage of capital and reserves. In
other words, there is no tendency towards a positive or negative relationship
for the whole sample. For 12 banks, the adjusted R Square is negative
indicating absence of any relationship. This is not due to the number of
observations for the regression; 7 of these 12 banks have the longest possible
period of data availability (21 years). Also, most of the banks showing no
relationship between performance and TNI have pursued strategies increasing
their TNI: Accelerating strategies (UBS, Dresdner Bank, Credit Suisse, BBV,
Argentaria) or Moderate (Commerzbank, BCH, Hypovereinsbank).
A stronger relationship is observed for 15 banks in the sample, showing
a relationship between TNI and performance is shown with an adjusted
R-Square higher than .25. Of these banks, 10 out of 15 show a negative
relationship between the level of TNI and profit before tax. In short, the
estimated signs of relationship between TNI and performance for the banks
are equally distributed for the positive and negative direction. For almost
a quarter of the sample, there is no relationship observable. Similar results are
yielded if profit before tax as a percentage of total assets is taken as a measure
for performance, or if performance is corrected for domestic performance or
the performance of the sample.
66 Profitability and shareholder valueTable 4.4. Relation between performance and TNI per bank, 1980–2000
Bank Constant TNI Adjusted R 
Square
n
Mitsubishi Bank -41.3455 ** 1.7494 ** 0.7555 16
NMB Bank 25.0550 ** -0.8623 ** 0.7405 10
HSBC 19.5547 ** -0.0415 ** 0.6550 14
CrØdit Lyonnais 41.4417 ** -0.6693 ** 0.6482 24
Tokyo-Mitsubishi 38.8505 ** -0.7705 ** 0.5921 13
Vereinsbank 21.0973 ** -0.7008 ** 0.5342 18
ABN/Amro 6.2651 ** 0.0921 ** 0.5099 14
HypoVereinsbank -21.6256 * 0.7142 * 0.4643 14
Rabobank 16.1435 ** -0.2597 ** 0.4211 21
Deutsche Bank -14.3680 0.7911 0.4100 21
Tokyo 147.5924 * -3.9174 * 0.3920 8
SBC 44.1174 ** -0.8996 ** 0.3228 18
ABN 25.2715 ** -0.4415 ** 0.2520 10
Agricole 13.4394 ** -0.1646 ** 0.2447 21
Dresdner Bank 25.8692 ** -0.2173 ** 0.2300 22
Santander 30.7243 ** -0.2006 ** 0.1935 20
Amro 17.0726 * -0.4890 * 0.1840 7
Bay. Hypobank 19.5109 ** -0.6484 ** 0.1797 18
Bank of America 28.4871 ** -0.4414 ** 0.1752 24
Citicorp -5.6162 0.5579 0.1467 24
LloydsTSB -62.8698 1.7589 0.1405 20
Sumitomo Bank -22.4133 0.9918 0.1325 24
BBV 26.0055 ** -0.1135 ** 0.1259 18
Paribas 30.3054 ** -0.4572 ** 0.1244 19
Standard Chartered -96.3675 1.4752 0.1019 24
UBS 5.2613 0.1632 0.0976 22
National Westminster 1.9070 0.4297 0.0828 21
Dai Ichi Kangyo 12.5835 ** -0.0575 ** 0.0766 24
JPMorgan 10.9245 ** -0.0202 ** 0.0608 12
BNP 3.7072 0.2916 0.0289 24
Chemical Banking 0.0026 0.4739 0.0268 16
Westdeutsche Landesbank 7.1014 ** -0.1036 ** 0.0213 24
Manufacturers Hanovers -26.3991 0.9058 0.0091 11
IBJ 26.2216 -0.6968 -0.0249 6
Credit Suisse 35.7957 ** -0.8437 ** -0.0271 27
Royal Bank of Scotland 38.6488 -0.7795 -0.0372 8
Societe Generale 20.8171 * -0.1054 * -0.0378 24
Commerzbank 13.4649 -0.0519 -0.0449 24
Chase Manhattan 16.2375 -0.0144 -0.0453 24
Barclays 20.0161 ** -0.0081 ** -0.0453 24
Midland -0.1983 0.2295 -0.0493 12
Fortis 20.2979 ** -0.4799 ** -0.0754 24
ING (bank) 19.4219 -0.3579 -0.0827 21
BCH 13.1710 * -0.1586 * -0.0891 7
Argentaria 13.0154 * 0.1917 * -0.1118 9
Mizuho Group 89.7522 -5.7455 -0.3796 3
**:  p value < .01, *:  p value < .05
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covered. For example, data for Midland Bank is available from 1980 to 1991
while data for Bank of America covers the full 21 years between 1980 and
2000. The regression results for Midland might have less explanatory power
than Bank of America’s due to the shorter time period. On the other hand the
estimation for Bank of America might yield insignificant results because over
the long time period, a “V-shaped” recovery is in general poorly estimated by
a single linear measure. To counter this problem, different time periods were
considered by calculating average TNI and profitability for five year period,
further grouping the TNI in steps of 20%.
Table 4.5. Change of TNI between 20% brackets per five year period
In Table 4.5, the numbers represent the number of occurrences of the TNI
values for full five year periods, moving from one TNI-bracket to another.
Condensing the total number of 737 yearly observations to full five year
periods produces 116 observations; the largest group has a TNI of 20–40%.
The table further shows that observations for TNI larger than 60% should be
ignored when drawing general conclusions; the 7 observations constitute 6%
of the total number of observations.
The next question is then to see what the dynamics are: how many banks shift
from one TNI-bracket to another? Changes take place between the 20–40%
TNI-bracket, and the 40–60% TNI-bracket. There are relatively few banks
that have moved from one bracket to a higher one: Credit Suisse, Deutsche
Bank while Bank of America did the opposite. The average profitability per
TNI bracket, excluding TNI higher than 60%, for the different five year
periods is shown in Figure 4.4. 
For the sample as a whole this suggests that between 1981 and 1985 there was
a linear and positive relationship between TNI and performance, and between
Change TNI from   
0-20 20-40  40-60  60-80  80-100 
0-20 29 3       
20-40 3  43  7     
40-60 1  6  14     
60-80     3  5   
80-100     2 




Total 33  52 24  5  2 
68 Profitability and shareholder value1986 and 1990 the relationship became negative but still was linear. Between
1991 and 2000 the relationship turned out to be V-shaped: profitability for
banks with TNI level of 20–40% was lower than for banks with TNI levels of
0–20%. The means of the first three brackets have significantly different
levels of means.
6
Summarizing, for most banks and most time periods there is a negative
relationship between performance and TNI. This suggests that a degree of
internationalization lower than 20% would have yielded the best
performance. Also, for most banks an increase in internationalization
correlates with a decrease in profitability, but this result is valid cross-section,
not longitudinal.
Figure 4.4. Relation between TNI and performance, five year periods
A closer look warrants the positive linear relationship between TNI in
1981–1985 in Figure 4.4, changing to a negative one in 1986 to 1990. The
relation between total performance and TNI is determined by calculating the
bivariate correlations between TNI and profit before tax per year. Figure 4.5
shows that the relationship between the two measures steadily breaks down:
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6 Using T test with p values < .05. There are 7 observations not shown in this graph, because
they are not representative compared to the other observations. 4 out of 7 are Standard Chartered
(2 observations for TNI 60–80%, 2 for higher than 80%. The other three are ABN Amro, HSBC,
and Credit Suisse, all with TNIs between 60–80%.Negative correlations can be observed for 1987, 1989 and 1990; from 1991
onwards the relationship between TNI and profitability has broken down
completely.
7 Correlations between TNI and profitability as a percentage of
assets remain more persistent, suggesting an asset driven approach to TNI until
1985. After a restructuring period in 1987–1990, similar values for the
correlations indicate that both performance measures have been synchronized.
Figure 4.5. Bivariate correlations between TNI and profit before tax, per year
Summarizing, a positive relationship between profitability and the degree of
internationalization cannot be found on a bank level. For almost a quarter of
the banks in the sample no such relationship has existed between 1980 and
2000; for the other half no tendency towards a positive or negative relationship
can be observed. For the total sample, there is only a positive relationship
between 1981 and 1985. For the other periods up to 2000, there is a negative
relationship between profitability and the degree of internationalization. The
negative relationship in 1986–90 is determined by the years 1987 and 1989.
After 1990 a weak form of a negative and V-shaped relationship exists. Banks
with the lowest levels of TNI in the sample, 0–20%, have shown the highest
performance. Banks with TNI levels of 40–60% have shown a higher
performance than banks with a TNI of 20–40%, but both reported lower
performance levels than banks with TNI of 0–20%. Overall do the results not
support the hypothesis that a higher degree of internationalization is positively
related to a higher performance of the total bank?
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7 For 1980–1985 and 1987 significance is below a .05 level.4.5 Internationalization and risk/return diversification
While internationalization might not on improve overall profitability, another
argument is that internationalization leads to more stable profitability through
geographical diversification. Rugman (1976) found that a higher ratio of
foreign to total operations is positively related to a lower variability of
earnings to book value, concluding that internationalization is risk reducing.
Literature on commercial banks in the United States generally finds that
larger, more geographically diversified institutions tend to have better
risk-return trade off (Berger et al., 2000, Goldberg 2001). Buch et al. (2004)
calculated efficient country-allocation portfolios, and compared these with
the actual allocations reported by banks. Overall, it was found that banks tend
to over-invest domestically, leading to suboptimal risk/return diversification
advantages.
In this study, risk/return diversification advantages were examined by the
ratio of variability of profitability and average profitability. The variability of
profitability was measured as the five year standard deviation of profit before
tax as a percentage of capital and reserves. A finding was that variability of
profitability increased with a higher degree of internationalization. This
suggests that the banks in the sample were on average not able to generate
additional profitability (reaping internalization advantages) and neither to
generate more stable earnings (profit from geographical diversification).
Figure 4.6: Relationship between return/risk of profitability and internationalization.
Profitability and shareholder value 71Similarly, another hypothesis was that geographical diversification
advantages should allow a bank to generate more stable results and improve
its return-to-risk ratio, i.e. average profitability (return) as a ratio of the
standard deviation of profitability (risk). Having established that foreign
activities do not structurally generate more return, the burden of proof lies
with the reduction of risk. However, no relationship exists between TNI and
risk. Combining the results for risk and return, internationalization in general
is negatively related to the level of the return-risk ratio.
4.6 Do shareholders gain by internationalization?
To  analyze the relationship between total shareholder return (TSR) and
degree of internationalization (TNI) for the whole sample, a simple model
was developed and estimated. TNI, and change in TNI were found to have
a positive relationship with shareholder return in line with the hypothesis,
especially between 1990 and 2000. But the estimates are in general
non-significant.
If shareholders – with hindsight – had made baskets for the different strategic
types, what would have been the result? Figure 4.7 presents the cumulative
return in US dollar per strategic type re-based at 100 in 1979. The yearly
return is weighted by market value; results do not change when banks are
equally weighted. A substantial difference over time emerges between two
groups: the Established (25.2% yearly return) and the Retreating (23.2%) on
the one hand and the Moderate (15.9%) and the Accelerating (14.3%) on the
other hand. An investment in banks with Established internationalization
compared to banks with Accelerating internationalization over a period of 20
years would have resulted in a total return 6 times as large, or an additional
9.5% per year.
72 Profitability and shareholder valueFigure 4.7. Total shareholder return per strategic type
The large differences in total return urge a closer examination of the
underlying data. The differences might simply be caused by a country bias:
most banks classified as Retreating and Established are American or British;
banks in these countries have in general shown higher shareholder returns
than other countries. To correct for this, the cumulative shareholder return
adjusted for the country’s bank index needs to be calculated. Another point of
examination is the Japanese banks. Since 1990, their equity prices have been
steadily falling, and classifying them all into one category might give biased
results. Table 4.6 presents the bank per strategic type, and shows the number
of banks that are American/British, Continental European, and Japanese.
Most of the Japanese banks fall either in the Retreating or  Established
category, more likely dampening the results for the Accelerating and
Moderate type banks which were already substantially higher.
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The yearly returns are recalculated, adjusting the yearly bank return for the
country return represented by the DataStream country bank index in US
dollar. The cumulative figure then represents the additional return one would
have achieved by investing in the individual banks instead of the country
index. This is shown in Figure 4.8.
The substantial differences in returns per strategy are mitigated to a large
extent. Adjusting for country shows that retreating banks had most to gain
between 1987 and 1998. Accelerating banks fared consistently worse than
retreating banks between 1987 and 2000, while in turn Accelerating banks
showed lower returns than Moderate banks. Overall, the division in returns
between Accelerating and Moderate banks on the one hand and retreated and
Accelerating banks on the other hand is upheld.







        
Accelerating  0  9  0  ABN Amro, BBV, Credit Suisse, Deutsche 
Bank, Dresdner Bank, HypoVereinsbank, 
Paribas, Santander, UBS 
 
Moderate  0  6  1  Amro, Argentaria, BayerischevHypobank, 




0  2  0  Crédit Lyonnais, Midland 
 
Retreating 7 0  3  Bank of America, Barclays, Chase Manhattan, 
Chemical Banking, Dai Ichi Kangyo, Lloyds 
TSB, Manufacturers Hanovers, Mitsubishi 
Bank, National Westminster, Sumitomo Bank 
Established 4  3 2  ABN,  BNP,  Citicorp, HSBC, J.P. Morgan, 
Société Générale, Standard Chartered, Tokyo-
Mitsubishi, Bank of Tokyo 
        
74 Profitability and shareholder valueFigure 4.8. Total shareholder return adjusted for country return per strategic type
In short, if indices are created for the different strategy types, then Established
and retreating banks would have generated the highest return 1980 and 2000,
if this is measured in absolute returns, or adjusted for country averages.
Moderate and Accelerating banks would have generated the least returns, in
spite of Accelerating banks having attracted relatively large amounts of
capital to fund their activities.
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This study has primarily provided a contemporary analysis of realized
internationalization strategies of banks in the 1980–2000 period. In this
section possible implications for internationalization of banks in the near
future are considered: can something be said of future internationalization
developments, and what consequences might this have for shareholders?
Three future developments are considered. First, which banks are most likely
to gain in the near future from internationalization? Next, what effects would
the further European integration have on the internationalization of banks.
Finally, what role will financial systems play?
5.1 Summary of findings
● The different analyses support the conclusion that foreign profitability on
average has been lower than domestic profitability for banks in the sample
between 1980 and 2000. An objection usually raised by banks in their
annual reports is that for reported figures, the allocation of foreign and
domestic profitability is to some extent arbitrary because some financial
services generated are consumed in more than one place. Examining the
relation between the degree of internationalization and total profitability
took this objection into consideration, but here too an overall negative
relationship between the degree of internationalization and total
profitability was found.
● The V-Shape of the relationship between profitability and
internationalization is reminiscent to the research debate in the
international business literature, where organizations might show learning
effects when their commitment and involvement in foreign activities
increase, resulting in different benefit-cost trade off pay-offs for the
organization. Our findings come close to a “J-curve”, assuming that over
time banks can learn to minimize the additional costs associated with
foreign expansion. This means that internationalization costs outweigh
benefits until banks gain experience and learn to deal with them (Ruigrok
& Wagner). Consequently, banks will reach an inflexion point along the
expansion path at which incremental benefits start to outweigh
incremental costs. This scenario implies that bank undergo a period of
77performance deterioration before experimental knowledge can lead to
higher performance levels. However, we find that a) the period of
performance deterioration is considerable and b) banks have to
substantially increase their international commitments before the inflexion
point is reached.
● Furthermore, internationalization patterns change over time.
Internationalization should not be looked at as a single process, but as
a chain of separate but linked processes. The end of one chain represents
the point of departure for the next. Internationalization can be described as
a “sedimentation” process, where different phases are stratified upon each
other (Nilsson, Dicken, & Peck, 1996). Since a large number of banks
have substantially increased their international activities over time, this
sedimentation process may hide positive effects of individual foreign
banking activities that should emerge after a period were banks show few
foreign acquisitions. This agrees with the recent upsurge in foreign versus
domestic profitability in 2001–2003, a period where merger and
acquisition activities was subdued (see Figure 2.1 on page 19).
● Shareholders clearly attached different valuations for different realized
internationalization strategies. Retreating and Established banks generated
the highest total shareholder return, whether this is measured in absolute
returns or adjusted for country averages. These groups include relatively
many American and British banks. Moderate and  Accelerating banks
generated the least shareholder return, in spite of Accelerating banks
having attracted relatively large amounts of capital to fund their (foreign)
activities. The high TSR for Retreating banks supports research that for
example shareholders in the United States experienced negative abnormal
returns when foreign acquisitions were announced; with this type of
realized internationalization strategy on average more foreign divestments
than acquisitions have been announced.
● Additional analyses considered the relationship between risk, return and
the degree of internationalization. No support was found that the level of
internationalization is a predictor for out- or underperformance in the
consecutive periods. In general, a higher degree of internationalization is
negatively related to additional shareholder return, albeit non significant.
On the other hand, performance had significant explanatory power for
shareholder return.
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Internationalization activities of banks changed considerably between 1980
and 2000. In 1980, American and British banks were at the helm of
internationalization. Japanese banks dominated the international scene in
1990. By 2000 many European banks had raised internationalization to new,
unprecedented heights, perhaps only matched by the internationalization of
banks in the colonial system at the start of the 20th century. The average
degree of internationalization for the sample did increase, but not
dramatically: the degree of internationalization (measured by TNI) moved
around 30% in the 1980s, and increased to 40% at the end of the 1990s.
There are similarities observable between the early 1980s and the late 1990s.
In the early 1980s, American and British banks had to make strategic choices
with regard to their internationalization activities just as Dutch, German,
Spanish and Swiss banks had to reconsider the role of their foreign banking
activities at the end of the 1990s. In the early 1980s, banks were confronted
with the decline of a smooth source of foreign income, the LDC loans; by the
late 1990s banks were confronted with the decline of stock markets reducing
both fee income and the attractiveness of the stock markets as a source of
foreign acquisition financing. A large number of banks in the sample
undertook some form of restructuring in 1999 and 2000, and continued this in
the years after. While the decrease in stock markets from 2000 onwards might
be alleviated, other triggers of strategic change are bound to follow, such as
financial crises.
Ultimately, internationalization of banks has been a mixed blessing for
shareholders over a longer period. Banks with long established foreign bank
activities (the Established banks) generated in the long run as a group the
highest shareholder return, similar to banks who substantially decreased the
role of foreign bank activities (the Retreating banks). On the other hand,
banks who either increased their internationalization activities steadily (the
Moderate banks) or with increasing pace (the Accelerating banks) have
generated the lowest shareholder return.
From the shareholder point of view, which banks’ internationalization
strategies are best positioned for the near future? Specifically, Accelerating
banks have increased their foreign bank activities at the end of the 1990s to
such an extent that these banks have become comparable in their degree of
internationalization to Established banks throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
Given the relative successful (shareholder) performance of Established
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success of Established banks? To answer these questions the possible future
courses of realized internationalization strategies (Moderate, Established,
Accelerating, Retreating)
8 are projected in Figure 5.1. For example,
Established banks have a relatively high degree of internationalization; the
solid line in the figure projects the current degree of internationalization into
the future, assuming no fundamental change in the role of foreign activities in
the bank. On the other hand, the dotted arrow shows a possible change in the
degree of internationalization.
Figure 5.1. Future directions of internationalization
If past experience provides any guidance, then an investment in banks with
realized Established and Accelerating strategies for the coming decade might
be worthwhile, while investments in banks with Retreating and Moderate
strategies should be considered with more caution.
● Established internationalization strategies
Established banks (such as Citicorp, HSBC) have found a durable balance
in the 1980s and 1990s between foreign and domestic bank activities.
These banks have in common that their foreign bank activities are broadly
based, branching out in investment banking, corporate finance as well as
retail banking (consumer finance) and asset management. Also, their
foreign activities are geographically well diversified. Established banks
have to maintain the right configuration to keep internationalization
a relative profitable activity, or the bank might divest activities that do not
contribute to the total profitability of the bank.
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8 The realized Imploding internationalization strategies are ignored here, this strategic type
applies to only two banks and is therefore difficult to generalize.● Accelerating internationalization strategies
Accelerating banks (examples are Deutsche Bank, ABN Amro, Credit
Suisse, UBS, Santander) have increased their internationalization
activities significantly during the 1990s and are at a position in the early
years of the new millennium similar to Established and Retreating banks
in the early 1980s. Either they have to find the right configuration to make
internationalization a relative profitable activity, or the bank will divest
activities because it has not found an opportunity for sustainable foreign
profitability and refocus on domestic activities. In other words,
Accelerating banks have to determine whether they soon will reach the
stage of Established banks, or they have to reconsider their portfolio of
foreign activities and become Retreating banks. In the past, both scenarios
were rewarded by shareholders. This suggests a paradox: banks with
Accelerating internationalization strategies have on average delivered the
least shareholder return in the past but are best positioned to generate the
most shareholder return in the near future.
The strategic choice banks with Accelerating strategies have between
developing either Established or Retreating strategies leads to the question
which banks with Accelerating strategies have characteristics more similar
to banks with Established strategies or more similar to Retreating
strategies. In other words, what banks with Accelerating strategies are
likely to evolve into Retreating strategies and what banks are likely to
develop Established strategies?
Naturally any future scenario is highly conjectural but to answer this, two
criterions are introduced. The case studies first indicate that when
domestic growth opportunities increase, banks favor domestic growth over
foreign bank growth. For most banks, the first priority is to maintain the
(relative) domestic market position, as well as seizing the best
opportunities to achieve profitability growth or efficiencies. Expansion of
domestic banking markets (mostly triggered by regulatory changes) led to
a decrease in internationalization of banks; this applied for American
banks, British banks and also Japanese banks. Naturally, this criterion does
not apply for banks with small and/or highly concentrated domestic
banking markets, such as the Netherlands and Switzerland. Future
domestic growth opportunities are however relevant for French and
German banks where de-mutualisation, and (further) abolishment of
separation between different banking types in the country might be future
events.
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a financial crisis. While the timing of financial crises cannot be predicted
as such, the banks that retreated the strongest or earliest were on average
banks with large capital market/investment banking operations. In short,
banks with more stable foreign funding bases such as foreign retail banks
or banks with more stable foreign fee income base such as asset
management and private banking are probably more likely to whither
economic and financial adverse conditions than banks with volatile
foreign activities in capital market/investment banking. This will be used
as the second criterion; both criterions suggest the following
categorization of future development (Figure 5.2).
Figure 5.2. Accelerating banks’ sensitivity to domestic market developments,
stability of foreign income
German banks with Accelerating strategies (Dresdner Bank,
WestDeutsche Landesbank and Deutsche Bank) are more likely to retreat
from foreign bank activities and eventually develop Retreating
82 The future of international bankinginternationalization strategies. Their potential domestic growth
opportunities are relatively large; when regulation permits these banks
might prefer domestic banking growth opportunities over foreign banking
growth opportunities. Also, these banks are more sensitive to external
shocks such as financial crises due to their high dependency on (foreign)
capital market activities. On the other hand, the Swiss, Dutch and Spanish
banks have no domestic growth opportunities; the Dutch banks ING and
ABN Amro have acquired large stable funding bases (retail banking
operations) outside the Netherlands. Credit Suisse and UBS have not
acquired retail networks outside Switzerland; UBS has created a relatively
stable source of foreign income through asset management and private
banking while Credit Suisse has more focused on expanding in investment
banking. In other words, ING, ABN Amro, UBS, Santander and BBVA
may be the banks who have developed and expanded internationalization
activities closest to banks with Established internationalization strategies.
● Retreating internationalization strategies
Similar to Accelerating banks, Banks with Retreating internationalization
have two strategic alternatives: either to maintain or further decrease
internationalization activities, or to increase them again
(re-internationalization). Lloyds TSB, Barclays and JP Morgan Chase
have re-internationalized or planned to do so. Lloyds TSB has publicly
contemplated increasing their internationalization activities in 2000, while
Barclays has re-internationalized in Spain but on a more subdued scale
than its European and American expansion activities in the 1980s. Chase
decreased its foreign bank activities since the mid 1980s but effectively
re-internationalized when it acquired J.P. Morgan in 2000 which had more
than half its operations outside the United States. Royal Bank of Scotland
also (re-) internationalized by acquiring National Westminster. National
Westminster decreased its foreign bank activities in the 1990s; after the
acquisition in March 2000 Royal Bank of Scotland developed
a specialized internationalization strategy, expanding its United States
retail branch network with a series of modest acquisitions and developing
foreign distribution channels for motor insurance activities.
The re-internationalization of Barclays or J.P.MorganChase is probably
not a repetition of the internationalization activities in the 1980s.
Compared to earlier periods, the banks have shown a strong focus on
domestic banking activities. Also, bank capital has become scarcer than in
the 1980s. At the end of 2003 the proposed structure and implementation
of Basle II introduced a more sophisticated regulatory framework for
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chosen, the allocation of capital to foreign bank activities is bound to be
more closely monitored and evaluated than in the 1980s. Some
internationalization incentives remain the same; the announced re-
internationalization of Lloyds TSB could be interpreted as seeking growth
opportunities after domestic expansion activities failed, when Lloyds TSB
was not allowed to acquire Abbey National in 2000. The other Retreating
banks have not re-internationalized; Bank of America autonomously
expanded investment banking operations in London but substantially
reduced the relative role of its foreign operations when it acquired
FleetBoston in 2003. For the retreated Japanese banks, the climate for re-
internationalization has become more favorable but the banks have largely
been engaged in domestic mergers to absorb the large write off of bad
loans, increase profitability and regain solvency.
● Moderate internationalization strategies
Finally, question marks surround the future shareholder returns of
Moderate banks: they have the widest range of strategic options available
to them, and are probably the most diverse bank group of realized
strategies. However, most of the Moderate banks have as yet sought to
increase their degree of internationalization. Fortis for example has
essentially stayed focused on the Benelux and Spain, consolidating and
integrating its bank operations and striving for autonomous growth. Crédit
Agricole on the other boosted its foreign activities since its acquisition of
wholesale bank Indosuez in 1994 but strengthened its domestic focus by
acquiring Crédit Agricole in 2002.
84 The future of international bankingTable 5.1. Possible changes in future internationalization of banks
What road leads to a sustainable and equal profitability development of
foreign and domestic banking activities? Table 5.1 summarizes the
hypothesized changes in realized internationalization strategies for the near
future. The number of banks with Established strategies will increase, so will
the number of banks with Retreating internationalization strategies.
5.3 Regional integration: extension of the home market?
A large degree of foreign activities of European banks (as well as American
banks) have taken place within European banking markets. Another
implication to consider is then the consequence of regional integration such
as the European Union, representing an economic and political extension of
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European integration process accelerated in two periods, between 1988 and
1991 (in preparation of the Single Market) and between 1996 and 1999 (in
preparation of the Eurozone). The economic integration programs liberalized
capital markets, and the introduction of the Euro led to a convergence of
monetary policies between the major EU countries. With European
integration, will the extension of the home market imply similar high
profitability as domestically, or should expansion in the Eurozone still be
considered internationalization to a foreign country, with lower foreign
performance than domestic as this study found?
Banks have dealt with European integration in several ways: pan-European
strategies were formulated by National Westminster, Barclays, Deutsche
Bank and Crédit Lyonnais in the 1980s. They built up a branch network in the
major European cities, and acquired retail or private banks in European
countries, mainly in Germany, France and Spain. In the 1990s, a new concept
was introduced: the “second home market” in Europe. These were
acquisitions of foreign banking activities with the expected benefits enjoyed
domestically (such as a large depositor base). Banks who followed this
strategy were ING with its 1997 acquisition of Belgian BBL or HSBC who
acquired French CCF in 2000. If banks view Europe as an extension of their
home market, then the findings of this study would suggest that this extension
in general lowers overall profitability. Is this finding also valid for European
banks internationalizing in the (integrated) European banking market?
Supporting the assumption that European integration extends the concept of
home market are convergence of net interest margins in the Eurozone, the
structural removal of regulatory barriers, and reduction of fluctuations in
GDP growth because economic cycles in the Eurozone converge. These
developments have in common those differences between “domestic” and
“foreign” economies within the Eurozone decrease.
Outwardly, one might interpret the process of European integration for the
banking markets as following the path taken by American banks since the mid
1990s, where ongoing deregulation of interstate banking has led to a natural
extension of the home market. Deregulation of interstate banking in basically
has created new markets with similar customers, introducing opportunities for
increased efficiency and higher profitability. However, European integration
cannot be compared to the banking deregulation in the United States.
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the home market within Europe. First, potential efficiency advantages may be
difficult to exploit. Consolidation of the banking market moves at different
paces in different countries; European labor market are considered to be rigid
implying that part of the cost-to-income ratio levels for banks in a country are
structural, especially for labor intensive retail banking. In other words,
efficiencies might be difficult to gain by foreign banking acquisitions in
Europe. Second, fiscal policies with regard to savings and pensions are not
harmonized. They determine to a large extent the growth of the savings pool
and the opportunities to be had. A scenario could be that further European
banking consolidation follows along these lines: Capital market activities in
Europe are to a large extent consolidated; dominated by a few American and
European banks for the region, with complementary dominant positions for
country based banks. Consolidation in the European banking market is then
directed at acquiring foreign retail banks. Capital markets are less influenced
by local tastes than retail banks, whether this is by a branch network or
a virtual network.
5.4 Limitations and further avenues for research
There are several limitations with this research that might also be interpreted
as future research avenues. A novel element of this study has been the
application of the TNI as internationalisation indicator, to analyse the
internationalisations strategies. Using one indicator is a strong simplification
of realized strategies. Increasing the number of strategic variables in
a framework of multidimensional clustering (cf. Abraham & Van Dijcke,
(2002)) is a promising avenue. Another indicator which has not been
addressed explicitly is the role of foreign acquisitions. Ideally, a separation in
the analysis should be sought after distinguishing between the operational
profitability of “daily” foreign banking activities, and the disproportional
effects of occasional foreign mergers and acquisitions.
Second, the discussion was about internationalization while the geographical
component (such as which country or region) has been not been to the
forefront. Adding geographical information, such as similarity and dynamics
of actual banking networks, in combination with the internationalization
indicator, would enhance the quality of clustering strategic types, as well as
providing more body to the herding argument, another explanatory variable
which has not been to the forefront.
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taken up the major part of internationalization, it needs to be researched
whether these findings can be replicated in a broader setting, increasing the
size of the sample. In addition, measuring the degree of internationalization is
challenging. The calculation of the DOI has been based on pragmatic reasons;
other alternatives including organizational must also be considered. For
example, if the internationalisation experience of the management board
would be taken into account, would this change results?
Finally, this analysis has neglected the complex interplay between financial
systems, economic growth and internationalization. While an individual bank
may not increased profitability through internationalisation, foreign banking
tends to increase competition and increase efficiency of foreign banking
systems, which stimulates economic growth. In other words, is there a trade
off between individual bank efficiency, and financial system efficiency?
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Country Bank    TNI   
   1 980 1990 2000 
       
France Agricole  2.3  4.0  17.9 
 BNP 27.6  30.5  47.7 
 CrØdit Lyonnais 11.3  32.5 25.1 
 Paribas 28.1  39.4 - 
 SociØtØ GØnØrale  29.2  27.4  34.9 
      
Germany Bayerische  Hypobank 4.8  4.4  - 
 Bayerische Vereinsbank  4.9  6.5  - 
 HypoVereinsbank -  -  36.1 
 Commerzbank 14.8  17.8  26.4 
 Deutsche Bank  9.3  23.6  59.0 
 Dresdner Bank  8.3  8.4  32.5 
 Westdeutsche Landesbank  8.6  12.3  41.2 
      
Spain  BBVA na  11.5  56.0 
 BCH na  - - 
 Santander na  29.3  59.5 
 Argentaria  na -   
      
Switzerland Credit  Suisse  26.7  47.5  69.3 
 SBC 41.2  38.6 - 
 UBS 27.9  37.8 65.5 
      
UK Barclays  51.5 44.3 28.5 
 HSBC .  44.4 56.4 
 LloydsTSB 40.9  18.9  15.1 
 Midland Bank  21.4  14.2  . 
 National Westminster  34.7  29.2  24.2 
 Standard Chartered  72.6 77.0 79.7 
      
Netherlands  ABN  30.5 - - 
 ABN/Amro -  32.7  72.0 
 Amro 13.5  - - 
 Fortis (bank)  -  28.8  33.6 
 ING (bank) 11.0  16.8  61.6 
 Rabobank na  14.5  20.2 
      
USA  Bank of America 48.3  21.8  7.6 
 Chase Manhattan  51.7  31.9  28.0 
 Chemical Banking  38.4  15.3  - 
 Citicorp 53.6  41.3  46.1 
 J.P. Morgan  47.7  41.7  - 
 Manufacturers Hanovers  54.6  38.6  - 
      
Japan Dai  Ichi Kangyo  29.0  39.6  19.1 
 IBJ 12.1  26.3 28.6 
 Mitsubishi Bank  31.5  33.5  - 
 Sumitomo Bank  36.4 35.0 20.5 
 Tokyo-Mitsubishi -  -  40.6 
 Bank of Tokyo  31.4  31.3  - 
       
       
-: bank not in sample. na: not available.   
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